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‘Biopiracy’ and Patents – 
Developing Countries’ fears are exaggerated 
 
I. Introduction 
In the debate on ‘biopiracy’ developed countries have been reproached with exploiting 
developing countries’ genetic resources and their indigenous communities’ traditional 
knowledge without authorisation or compensation by granting patents on inventions 
derived from those genetic resources and traditional knowledge. The conflict between 
developing and developed countries in the context of intellectual property rights law 
and particularly in respect of patents, however, is not new. Developed countries have 
accused many developing countries, for example China, that they “pirate” their 
products, that is copying patented products without authorisation of the patentee and 
thus infringing patents. Developing Countries increasingly counter such accusations 
with the slogan ‘biopiracy’.  
 
The debate on ‘biopiracy’ is heated and filled with many emotions. Politicians from 
developing countries, environmental and other activists as well as non-governmental 
organisations from all over the world are engaged in the discussion. In the discussion 
striking arguments have been used such as the ‘exploitation’ of indigenous communities 
in developing countries and the ‘extinction’ of their traditional ways of living by 
‘biopiracy’. That is why this discussion has attracted so much attention worldwide. 
Demonstrations against alleged ‘biopiracy’ patents have been organised and thousands 
of people followed. 
 
Developing countries have recognised that their genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge form valuable assets which have a great market value. They see that mainly 
foreign companies make profits with products that have been derived from their original 
resources. Indeed, according to Daniel Wüger “the value of developing countries’ 
germplasm to the pharmaceutical industry in the early 90s was estimated to be at least 
$32billion per year”.1 The figures for the annual global markets for products in the 
                                                 
1 Daniel Wüger, ‘Prevention of Missappropriation of Intangible Cultural Heritage Through Intellectual 
Property Laws’, in: J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler (ed.), ‘Poor People’s Knowledge Promoting 
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healthcare, agriculture, horticulture, and biotechnology sectors derived from genetic 
resources are supposed to lie between US $ 500 billion and US $ 800 billion according 
to ten Kate and Laird.2 It also “has been claimed that of the 120 active compounds 
derived from plants that are widely used in contemporary medicines, 75 per cent were 
already known within traditional knowledge systems”.3 Thus, it does not surprise that 
the economic significance of genetic resources and traditional knowledge has been 
increasingly recognised and that developing countries have tried to get a share of this 
market. 
 
Connected with the ‘biopiracy’ debate is the general debate on globalisation and in 
respect of intellectual property rights the debate on the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS’). TRIPS is the first 
comprehensive legislation on intellectual property rights that is compulsory for all WTO 
member countries, therefore for almost all countries in the world.  
 
This thesis will examine such ‘‘biopiracy’ patents’ and tries to evaluate whether the 
criticisms related with them are true and whether and how far these patents have indeed 
negative impacts on indigenous communities and developing countries. It will be shown 
that the fear of the slogan ‘biopiracy’ is exaggerated since the criticisms related with it 
are largely unjustified and since there is no direct impact on indigenous communities or 
developing countries. Even the few negative impacts can be resolved by the developing 
countries with the help of suitable national legislation. Thus, developing countries 
should rather enact appropriate legislation to make use of the available TRIPS 
regulations to promote innovation in their own territory to benefit better from their 
resources than it is the case up to now. 
 
The second chapter will provide a definition of ‘biopiracy’ and the terms ‘genetic 
resources’ and ‘traditional knowledge’ that are related with the term ‘biopiracy’. 
                                                                                                                                               
Intellectual Property in Developing Countries’ (2004), available at www.worldbank.org/research/ 
Poor_Peoples_Knowledge.pdf, 183-206, at 160. 
2 Kerry ten Kate / Sarah A Laird, ‘Bioprospecting Agreements and Benefit Sharing with Local 
Communities’, in: J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler (ed.), Poor People’s Knowledge Promoting 
Intellectual Property in Developing Countries (2004), 133-158, at 134. 
3 Coenraad J. Visser, ‘Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for Traditional Knowledge’, in: J. 
Michael Finger and Philip Schuler (ed.), ‘Poor People’s Knowledge Promoting Intellectual Property in 
Developing Countries’ (2004), 207-240, at 213. 
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Moreover, a survey of the background of the topic will be given why those resources 
have been increasingly interesting for corporations.  
In the third chapter the relevant TRIPS provisions are presented as they form the 
minimum standard of intellectual property protection every WTO member has to 
provide. Thus, these regulations are of importance for every WTO member’s patent law. 
When examining the patent examples one has to keep in mind these minimum 
provisions. 
 
The bulk of this dissertation is dedicated to the evaluation of the most known examples 
of ‘biopiracy’ patents. First a survey of the criticisms related to ‘biopiracy’ is given 
followed by a classification of those criticisms in actually two main parts which can be 
described as ‘bad’ patents and ‘good’ patents. The examples of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ patents 
are analyzed with regard to whether they actually were ‘biopiracy’ patents and in how 
far the criticisms connected with them were justified. An intermediate result in chapter 
V summarises the findings and concludes that there is just one real problem related with 
‘bad’ patents, whereas the claims in respect of ‘good’ patents cannot be validated. The 
final chapter will show that developing countries are able to prevent the entire 
‘problem’ of ‘biopiracy’ because they can prevent ‘bad’ as well as ‘good’ patents from 
being granted. Thus, the alleged problems would not emerge.  
II. What is ‘biopiracy’? 
The conflict between Developing Countries and Developed countries in the context of 
‘biopiracy’ is strictly spoken not concerned with the violation of intellectual property 
rights. Although there is no generally accepted definition of ‘biopiracy’ it can be stated 
that it is concerned with the exploitation of genetic resources of Developing Countries 
and traditional knowledge of indigenous communities within these countries4.  
A. Definition of “‘biopiracy’” 
Most authors define ‘biopiracy’ as the (unauthorized and uncompensated) appropriation 
and commercial exploitation of genetic resources in Developing Countries and/or 
                                                 
4 Report of the British Commission on IPR, ‘Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy’, at 74; Susan K Sell, ‘Post Trips Developments: The tension between commercial and social 
agendas in the context of Intellectual Property’, 14 Fla. J. Int’l L. 193, 202; Graham Dutfield, What is 
‘biopiracy’?, available at: www.canmexworkshop.com/ documents/papers/I.3.pdf, at 1.
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traditional knowledge of indigenous communities by corporations, mostly from 
Developed Countries, which seek then “monopoly control”, usually patents, over these  
resources or inventions derived from these resources.5
 
Indeed, “intellectual property rights, especially patents”, as stipulated in the TRIPs 
Agreement “have been criticised” by many Developing countries and indigenous 
communities “because they are considered to encourage and legitimise ‘biopiracy’.6  
It is not obvious in which way intellectual property rights, particularly patents, can 
contribute to this alleged exploitation. Patents are supposed to stimulate innovation and 
new technologies by granting the inventor an exclusive right over the invention for a 
limited period of time and not to exploit genetic resources or traditional knowledge of 
indigenous communities.7 Understanding the allegations demands to clarify the terms of 
“indigenous communities”, “traditional knowledge” and “genetic resources” and why 
they are said to be of interest to corporations. 
B. Genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
There is neither a uniform or agreed definition of indigenous communities nor of 
traditional knowledge.8  
                                                 
5 Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group) cited in: Report of the British 
Commission on IPR, note 4, at 74; Susan Sell, note 4, at 202; Dutfield, ‘What is ‘biopiracy’?’, note 4, at 
1,3; Pollyanna Folkins, ‘Has the Lab Coat Become the Modern Day Eye Patch? Thwarting ‘biopiracy’ of 
Indigenous Resources By Modifying International Patenting Systems’, 13 Transnat’ l L. & Contemp. 
Probs (2003), 339 at 343; Gerard Downes, ‘Implications of TRIPs for Food Security in the majority 
world’, (2003) available at: www.comlamh.org, at 15; Ruchi Tripathi, ‘Implications of TRIPs on 
livelihood of poor farmers in developing countries’, ActionAid paper (2000), available at: 
www.actionaid.org/wps/content_document.asp?doc_id=406, at 4. 
6 Graham Dutfield, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Bioprospecting and the TRIPS Agreement: Threats and 
Opportunities’, in: Peter Drahos / Ruth Mayne (ed.), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, 
Access and Development (2002), 135 at 135; Folkins, note 5, at 340, 341, 342; David Downes, ‘Using 
Intellectual Property as a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge: Recommendations for Next Steps’, 
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) Discussion Paper 1997, available at 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/UsingIPtoProtectTraditionalKnowledge.pdf, at 3; Manuel Ruiz, ‘Access 
to Genetic Resources, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity: Processes and Synergies’; 2004, 
available at: www.iucn.org/themes/pbia/wl/docs/trade/ipsdweek_may04/PGCS_TB_Ruiz.pdf, at 5. 
7 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 5;14.; David Downes, CIEL, note 6, at3. 
8 for the term traditional knowledge: Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at p.75; Graham 
Dutfield, Developing and Implementing National Systems For Protecting Traditional Knowledge: 
Experiences In Selected Developing Countries, in: Sophia Twarog and Promila Kapoor (ed.), Protecting 
and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: Systems, National Experiences And International Dimensions, 
UNCTAD 2004, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted10_en.pdf, 141 – 153, at 141; Visser, 
note 3, at 207. 
for the term “indigenous communities”: Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indigenous_people; 
United Nations, Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Background Paper 
PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (2004), available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/PFII%202004%20WS.1%203% 20bDefinition.doc, p.1. 
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Based on different formulations it can be stated that indigenous populations have the 
peculiarity that they are at least in part distinct from the surrounding populations in a 
nation state with regard to linguistic, cultural and social characteristics.9 According to 
the U.N. Working Definition of Indigenous Populations / Peoples they are “composed 
of the existing descendants of peoples who inhabited the present territory of a country 
wholly or partially at the time when persons of a different culture or ethnic origin 
arrived there”.10
Sometimes definitions of traditional knowledge refer to indigenous communities, 
comprising “knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyle”.11 Other formulations without reference to indigenous 
cultures are more far-reaching and comprise every innovation and invention based on 
tradition12. Agreement exists in so far as traditional knowledge is based on experience 
and is usually passed on through generations.13 In the context of this thesis the term 
‘traditional knowledge’ refers to such knowledge associated with genetic resources. 
A definition of genetic resources is provided for in the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD): Article 2 defines it as “any material of plant, animal, 
microbial, or other origin containing functional units of heredity”.14
C. Interest of corporations 
With the development of biotechnology multinational pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological corporations began research work on products on the basis of (plant) 
genetic resources.15 According to Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A Laird “the annual global 
markets for products in the healthcare, agriculture, horticulture, and biotechnology 
sectors derived from genetic resources lie between US $500 billion and US $800 
                                                 
9 Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indigenous_people; U.N. Working Definition of Indigenous 
Populations / Peoples (1982), cited in http://www.humanrights.ch/cms/front_content.php?client=1& 
lang=1&idcat=513&idart=2170&m=&s=&zur=513
10 U.N. Working Definition of Indigenous Populations / Peoples, (adapted by the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations in 1982), cited in www.humanrights.ch, available at http://www.humanrights.ch/ 
cms/front_content.php?client=1&lang=1&idcat=513&idart=2170&m=&s=&zur=513. 
11 Preamble and Art. 8 (j) Convention on Biological Diversity, available at: www.biodiv.org. 
12 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Report 2001 on Fact-Finding Missions on 
Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge (“FFM”) (1998-1999) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/ report/final/pdf/part1.pdf, p.25; Visser, note 3, at 207. 
13 Dutfield, in Peter Drahos, note 6, at 136; International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
Trade and Development Brief No.7 (2003), available at:  http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx? 
id=555, at  1; WIPO, FFM Report 2001, note 12, at 25. 
14 Kerry ten Kate / Sarah A Laird, ‘The Commercial Use of Biodiversity, Access to Genetic Resources and 
Benefit-Sharing’, 1999, Earthscan London, at 17. 
15 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 2nd ed., at 57. 
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billion”.16 For this reason so called ‘bioprospecting’ has been carried out. Biological 
diversity in many countries has been explored and screened for potentially 
commercially valuable genetic resources17. In Developing countries most of the 
bioprospecting has been carried out as the highest biological diversity is located in 
tropical and subtropical regions, where also most of the Developing countries are 
concentrated.18 For the search to be carried out cost-effectively and efficiently in regard 
of time, the corporations have used traditional knowledge of indigenous communities 
about plants and plant genetic resources. The knowledge of those communities is said to 
help identifying valuable substances in natural sources more easily.19  
An additional patent protection on the “new” product ensures the company an exclusive 
exploitation right which is an economical very valuable asset. Developing countries 
noticed the increased importance of their genetic resources and traditional knowledge of 
indigenous communities within their territory. But due to the lack of a strong 
technological base, particularly in biotechnology, they have not been able to participate 
to the same extent in the economic exploitation of their genetic resources as the mostly 
foreign corporations could. Thus, the Developing countries fear that they are deprived 
of their biological and cultural resources without being rewarded for providing these 
resources. 
III. TRIPS regulations on patents in the context of 
‘biopiracy’ 
The TRIPS agreement sets out minimum standards of intellectual property protection 
that every WTO member has to meet. It is the most important international treaty which 
is concerned with patents. A patent is defined as “a grant of a property right by the 
government to the inventor for an invention20”, “giving the inventor the right for a 
limited period to stop others from making, using, importing or selling the invention 
without the permission of the inventor”.21  
                                                 
16 Kate / Laird, Biodiversity, note 14, at 134; Kate / Laird, Bioprospecting, note 2, at p. 134. 
17 Kate / Laird, Biodiversity, note 14, at 135 (definition of bioprospecting). 
18 Paul Gepts, Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be Compensated?, Plant Physiology, 
April 2004, Vol.134,1295 at 1298, available at: http://www.plantphysiol.org/cgi/content/full/134/4/1295. 
19 Lakshmi Sarma, ‘Biopiracy: twentieth century imperialism in the form of international agreements’, 13 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. (1999), 107 at 113; Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), 
Bioprospecting / Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples, 2002, available at http://www.kahea.org/lcr/pdf/ 
bioprospecting_people.pdf, at 1. 
20 http://www.silo.lib.ia.us/specialized-services/patents-trademark/patent-definition.htm 
21  The UK Patent Office: http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/whatis/definition.htm; Report of the British 
Commission on IPR, note 4, at 12. 
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The patent section of the TRIPS agreement is comprehensive both in scope and 
coverage. According to article 27.1 “patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology. Countries cannot exclude 
entire technologies like biotechnology as they had extensively done in the past.22  
An ‘invention’ must fulfil three criteria, namely ‘novelty’, ‘inventive step’ and 
‘industrial applicability’23, whereas the latter two “may be deemed by a member to be 
synonymous with the terms “non obvious” and “useful” respectively”.24  Although there 
are no clear international standards and national legislation differs substantively, a 
common interpretation of the three patentability criteria is as follows:25 “An invention 
must constitute new knowledge, i.e. when compared to the state of the art” at the time of 
application (novelty), must not be “obvious to a person skilled in the art”26 (inventive 
step) and the invention must somehow be susceptible of industrial application 
Article 27.1 also contains a non-discrimination principle as to the place of invention, the 
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced27. This 
means that WTO members cannot distinguish between goods that are, for example, 
essential to life or health and other goods and cannot require the local production for an 
invention to be patentable.28  
Nevertheless there is some flexibility in the definitions of ‘invention’ and of the three 
criteria ‘novelty’, ‘inventive step’ and ‘industrial applicability’ as TRIPS does not 
define any of these concepts. The lack of clear definitions gives member countries 
flexibility with regard to the interpretation of these criteria and the scope of 
patentability.  
Articles 27.2 and 27.3 contain some exceptions to patentability. WTO members may 
provide for an exemption to protect “odre public or morality” and they may also exclude 
from patentability specified methods for the treatment of humans or animals and even 
plants and animals themselves.29 Moreover member states are not obliged to grant 
patents on essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals.30 The 
protection by patents of micro-organisms and non biological processes, however, is 
                                                 
22 Carlos M Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries, The TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options, Zed Books Ltd., London 2000, p. 50. 
23 Article 27.1 TRIPS. 
24 Footnote to Article 27.1 TRIPS. 
25 Philippe Cullet, Food Security and Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries (2003), 
available at  http://www.ribios.ch/fr/documents/docs/Brochurespdf/Brochure6FoodsecDPI.pdf , at. 23. 
26 ibid. at 23. 
27 Article 27 TRIPS, last sentence. 
28 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at. 6. 
29 Article 27.2, 27.3 a) TRIPS. 
30 Article 27.3 b) TRIPS. 
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mandatory.31 But TRIPS does not give any definition of “essentially biological 
processes” or “micro-organism”.  
Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS allow for limited exceptions to the exclusive 
exploitation right conferred by a patent. 
In the context of ‘plant genetic resources’ it is important to note that the TRIPS 
agreement requires protection when a plant has been modified by technological 
processes that a new plant variety has originated. Plant varieties must be protected 
“either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or any combination thereof”.32 
TRIPS again does not define what a plant variety is. 
Summarised, the TRIPs Agreement stipulates to grant patents in any field of 
technology, but allows for exceptions mainly in the field of biotechnology with the 
possible exclusion of plant, animals and biological processes. Thus, patents on 
inventions based on genetic resources are possible but not required (as long as the 
invention concerns plants or essentially biological processes). Protection becomes 
mandatory if the invention based on genetic resources or traditional knowledge covers a 
non-biological process. The agreement, however, does not directly address traditional 
knowledge. It sets out a minimum standard to be applied by all WTO members, but 
allows countries to expand the protection to new areas, for example to cover traditional 
knowledge provided that the requirements of patentability are met. Thus, TRIPS gives 
members the option, “within certain limits, of defining the scope of patentability in a 
quite a broad way”.33  
IV. Criticisms of ‘biopiracy’ 
The use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge of indigenous communities and 
the patenting of inventions derived from these resources are seen as a new form of 
“western imperialism”.34 ‘biopiracy’ is said to be unfair, unethical and a threat to the 
existence of indigenous cultures.35
 
It has been alleged that using traditional knowledge and then obtaining a patent on an 
invention derived from genetic resources and traditional knowledge is unfair to the 
indigenous communities. The patent will be the exclusive property of the company 
                                                 
31 Article 27.3 b) TRIPS. 
32 Article 27.3 b) TRIPS. 
33 Correa, IPR, note 22, at 50. 
34 Susan Sell, note 4, at  202. 
35 Gervais, note 15, at 61; Folkins, note 5, at 343, 344; Sarma, note 19, at 113. 
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although the indigenous community has contributed to the invention.36 Traditional 
knowledge has been described as being “communal and sacred in nature” why it should 
not be “the private property of a corporation”.37
 
Another important allegation is that ‘biopiracy’ means exploiting the indigenous 
communities and Developing countries and also jeopardizing their way of living and 
their livelihood.38 The “penetration of bioprospectors” and the collecting of biological 
resources from indigenous communities would amount to a violation of “sacred customs 
and traditions” and would have a “dramatic impact” on the indigenous group.39 “It is 
also claimed that indigenous communities are bared from using or exporting their 
biological resources and traditional knowledge that they have developed40. Ultimately 
traditional knowledge would become extinct.41
 
In this context the TRIPS Agreement is blamed for only working in favour of 
transnational corporations and not recognizing or protecting traditional knowledge. 
Hence it would facilitate ‘biopiracy’.42 It would use “Eurocentric concepts”, which 
would see creations of indigenous peoples as savage and primitive.43 Particularly the 
current patentability standards introduced by the TRIPS Agreement are condemned. 
These, it is claimed, are too narrow for the protection of traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources and would discriminate indigenous communities.44  
Particularly three points are made regarding this allegation. Firstly, the lacking 
definition of novelty in the TRIPS Agreement would make it possible to define novelty 
standards which do not recognize “the public use or oral transfer of traditional 
knowledge”.45  
                                                 
36 Gervais, note 15, at 61; Sarma, note 19, at 113. 
37 Jonathan Luna, ‘Bioprospecting or Biopiracy, the Complex Relations of the Appropriation of 
Indigenous Knowledge’ (2005), Florida State University D-Scholarship Repository, Article #85, available 
at: http://dscholarship.lib.fsu.edu/undergrad/85, at 18. 
38 Shiva, note 34, at p. 3; Sarma, note 19, at 113; Folkins, note 5, at 343, 344; Luna, note 37, at 19. 
39 Folkins, note 5, at 343, 344. 
40 Folkins, note 5, at 341. 
41 Sarma, note 19, at 112. 
42 Folkins, note 5, at  351. 
43 Folkins, note 5, at  348. 
44 Folkins, note 5, at 348,351; Vandana Shiva, ‘Corporate Hijack of Biodiversity, How WTO-TRIPs Rules 
Promate Corporate Hijack of People’s Biodiversity and Knowledge’, available at www.vshiva.net, at 30; 
David Downes, CIEL, note 6, at p.3. 
45 WTO IP/C/W/370, Note by the Secretariat, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore. 
Summary of Issues Raised and Points made (08.08.2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org, at 6; 
Gervais, note 15, at 233. 
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The TRIPS patentability requirement of “industrial application” and the notion of 
“invention” would prevent indigenous communities from obtaining a patent on their 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge because they are either seen as discoveries, 
thus as obvious, or as being in the public domain or not traceable to a specific 
inventor46. The companies that take genetic resources from indigenous communities 
and develop products (e.g. drugs) based on those resources and traditional knowledge, 
however, could own patents enabling the company to sell the invention back to its “true 
inventors”47. For these reasons Shiva accuses the modern intellectual property system to 
be a “denial of the collective innovation” of indigenous cultures “over thousands of 
years”48. Moreover, the TRIPS agreement is condemned for not providing for “fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the patenting of genetic resources”.49 The 
companies could earn “millions of dollars” by using traditional knowledge, but 
indigenous communities however would never be justly compensated for their 
contributions to the companies.50
 
Thus, the TRIPS agreement is seen to facilitate ‘biopiracy’. ‘Biopiracy’ itself, and 
indirectly the TRIPS agreement as well, are seen as a mean of exploitation of 
developing countries and indigenous communities. There is a general suspicion against 
developed countries and their transnational corporations to conduct a new form of 
colonialism. 
Since the definition of ‘biopiracy’ comprises the formulation “seeking monopoly 
control” and because virtually all criticisms mentioned above refer to the grants of 
patents this thesis therefore will confine itself to this particular problem.  
A.  ‘Good’ patents / ‘bad’ patents 
The criticisms in the context of ‘biopiracy’ actually can be divided in two large 
categories. They actually comprise two points of contact to Patent law. They can be 
described as granting of ‘bad’ patents and granting of ‘good’ patents.51  
                                                 
46 Gervais, note 15, at 61; Folkins, note 5, at 351; Dutfield in: Peter Drahos, note 6, at 144; Background 
Note of the UNCTAD Secretariat, Systems and National Experiences for Protecting Traditional 
Knowledge, Innovations and Practices, Appendix II in: Sophia Twarog and Promila Kapoor (ed.), 
Protecting and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: Systems, National Experiences And International 
Dimensions, UNCTAD 2004, 353-372, at 360. 
47 Dutfield in: Peter Drahos, note 6, at144; Sarma, note 19, at 114. 
48 Shiva, note 34, at p. 4. 
49 Shiva, note 34, at p. 30. 
50 Folkins, note 5, at 341; Luna, note 37, at 34. 
51 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 74; IISD, note 13, at 1. 
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1. ‘Bad’ patents 
These are patents that have been granted for inventions based on genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge which actually did not fulfil the patentability requirements 
stipulated in the TRIPS agreement. They were “either not novel or not inventive having 
regard to traditional knowledge already in the public domain”.52 These patents are 
described as plagiarism of traditional knowledge.53 The mistake of granting ‘bad’ 
patents is not only blamed on lacking access of the patent offices to traditional 
knowledge but also on an improper application of the patentability requirements by the 
patent offices.54 This kind of patents attracts allegations like the “exploitation” and 
“imperialism” arguments mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
2. ‘Good’ patents 
Even if patents on inventions derived from genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
of indigenous communities are correctly granted according to the patentability 
requirements, they are deemed to be ‘biopiracy’ if there was no prior informed consent 
by the community or if the company did not enter into an agreement with the 
indigenous community on sharing the benefits accrued from the invention.55  
In this context the TRIPS agreement is particularly blamed for not taking into 
consideration such requirements, thus exploiting the indigenous communities. 
 
This work will go on to evaluate the best known examples of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ patents, 
how they could emerge and mainly if and to what extent the allegations connected with 
them were justified. Then it will be analyzed which possibilities developing countries 
have to solve possible problems. 
B. Cases and evaluation of the criticisms 
1. ‘Bad’ patents 
Before a patent office grants a patent it has to review whether the patentability 
requirements are fulfilled. In the context of the ‘bad’ patents it is claimed that the 
                                                 
52 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 74. 
53 Vandana Shiva, ‘Who are the real pirates?’, Third World Resurgence, Third World Network, 
Malaysia, No. 63, November 1995, (1995), 16 at.16,19.  
54 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 74 
55 ibid. at p. 74; IISD, note 13, at 1; Sarma, note 19, at 116; Fritz Dolder, Patente auf der Grundlage 
traditioneller Kenntnisse indigener Gemeinschaften, in: Christoph Ann (ed.), Festschrift für Reimar 
König, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln 2003, 81, at 83. 
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patented invention does not meet the standards. Evaluating the most “famous” examples 
of ‘bad’ patents it will be analyzed why they could be granted whether they were 
actually ‘bad’ patents and whether the allegations combined with them were justified. 
All patents that have been subject to this kind of allegation had been granted by the 
European Patent Office (“EPO”) or the United States Trademark and Patent Office 
(“USPTO”). Therefore the rules that are underlying the granting of patents must be 
presented shortly.  
a) Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC) 
Article 52 EPC contains the patentability requirements for an invention. As stipulated in 
article 27.1 of the TRIPS agreement inventions “which are new and which involve an 
inventive step” and are “susceptible of industrial application” are patentable.56 
Inventions are delimited from not patentable discoveries in article 52.2 EPC.  
The EPC uses the possible exceptions to the general patentability provided for in TRIPS 
only partially. Article 52.4 EPC excludes “methods for treatment of the human or 
animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods”; article 53 excludes plant or 
animal varieties and essentially biological processes from patentability. 
Biotechnological inventions are, in principle, patentable under the EPC. Rules 23 b – e 
of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents57 
are defining and limiting the patentability of certain biotechnological inventions. 
“Biological material”, which is defined in rule 23b.2, shall be patentable if it “is isolated 
from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process” as well as 
plants or animals as long as “the technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to 
a particular plant or animal variety”.58 Thus, inventions derived from plant genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge can be patentable provided they meet the novelty, 
inventive step and industrial application requirements and do not form one plant variety 
solely.  
The only remaining restriction to those inventions is contained in the “odre public” and 
“morality” exemption of article 53 a) EPC.  
 
An invention is new according to article 54 EPC if “it does not form part of the state of 
the art”. State of the art comprises all knowledge in any part of the world that is in the 
                                                 
56 Article 52.1 EPC, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html. 
57 “Implementing Rules”, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma2.html#REG. 
58 Rule 23 c) of the Implementing Rules, note 52; Article 53 b) EPC. 
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public domain either through written or oral description or in public use in any other 
manner59. The EPC uses an ‘absolute’ novelty standard as it includes all knowledge 
anywhere in the world. An ‘inventive step’ is existent according to article 56 EPC if “it 
is not obvious to a person skilled in the art”. Obvious is everything “which does not go 
beyond the normal progress of technology but merely follows plainly or logically from 
the prior art”.60  
The third element “industrial application” is defined in a broad sense. According to the 
Guidelines for Examination “industry is an activity which belongs to the useful or 
practical arts as distinct from the aesthetic arts” and “does not necessarily imply the use 
of a machine or the manufacture of an article”.61 The possibility of the production or 
use in a commercial, non private field is deemed to be sufficient.62  
 
Following the application the patent office produces a search report on the issue 
whether an invention is ‘new’ and ‘inventive’ taking into consideration every document 
available to them.63 Articles 99 and 100 EPC provide an opposition procedure in which 
every person can file an opposition to a patent granted within 9 months after publication 
on the grounds that the patent does not meet the requirements of patentability in Articles 
52 to 57 EPC. As required by the TRIPs agreement the protection term of a patent is 20 
years.64 There is a uniform extent of protection which depends on the terms of the 
claims the inventor makes.65 The rights actually conferred by the European patent, 
however, follow the rights conferred by a patent according to the national patent laws in 
each of the contracting parties in respect of which the European patent was granted.66 In 
Germany a patent, and thus an European patent as well, gives the patentee the exclusive 
right to prevent every other person from producing, offering, using and importing the 
patented invention.67 The protection is limited to the territories of the Contracting 
Parties of the EPC in respect of which the patent is granted.68
                                                 
59 Article 54.2 EPC. 
60 Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Part C, Chapter IV 9.4, available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/e/index.htm. 
61 Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Part C, Chapter IV, 4.1. 
62 Margarete Singer / Dieter Stauder, Europäisches Patentübereinkommen (“EPC”), 2nd ed. 2000, article 
57 Rn. 5,6. 
63Article 92 EPC; Rule 44 Implementing Rules. 
64 Article 63 EPC. 
65 Article 69 EPC. 
66 Article 64 EPC. 
67 Article 64 EPC, §9 German Patent Law (PatG), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/patg/ 
index.html. 
68 Article 3 and 64 EPC – so called “territorial principle”. 
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b) US Patent Act 
The US Patent Act is codified in title 35 of the United States Code69. According to 
section 101 a patent can be obtained for every invention or discovery70 of a “new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvements thereof”.  
Since the “Chakrabarty” decision of the U.S Supreme Court even living organisms and 
cells are seen as patentable objects in accordance with section 101 Patent Act.71 In 
principle, natural phenomena as well as natural products in their natural state are 
excluded from patentability (laws of nature doctrine)72. Patents on processes and 
concrete applications of ‘laws of nature’, however, are possible. As soon as natural 
substances are modified in any way these inventions also can be patented. Thus, “an 
isolated or purified form of a natural product” is counted among the patentable objects 
and is new in a prior art sense.73
The Patent Act does not make use of the possible exceptions to patentability provided in 
the TRIPS agreement what is in contrast to the EPC.74 The Patent Act even does not 
provide for an exception to patentability based on “odre public” or on moral grounds as 
the EPC does in article 53 a). 
 
Another important difference is the definition of novelty in the Patent Act. Novelty of 
an invention is defined in Sec. 102 a) of the Patent Act. An invention is not regarded as 
new if it “was patented or described in a printed publication” in the United States or in a 
foreign country “before the invention thereof by the applicant”. Public use or public 
knowledge only counts among prior art if “the invention was known or in use” in the 
United States, thereby ignoring use or knowledge in any other country in the world75. 
This definition of novelty is called ‘relative novelty’76. The same problem is true for 
Section 102 b) according to which the inventor loses the right of obtaining a patent if 
more than one year has elapsed between a printed publication of the invention by the 
applicant or others and the application for patent. Public use or sale in foreign countries 
                                                 
69 available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_laws.pdf. 
70 Section 100 a) Patent Act: the term “invention” also covers “discovery”. 
71 U.S. Supreme Court, in GRUR International 1980, 627 at 627, 629. 
72 ibid. at.627, 629. 
73 Correa, IPR, note 22, at 177. 
74 confer Article 52.4, 53 EPC. 
75 both: Section 102 a) Patent Act. 
76 Correa, IPR, note 22, at 58. 
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does not bar patentability77. Since the TRIPS agreement does not provide a definition of 
novelty the “relative” novelty definition does not violate article 27.1 of the TRIPS 
agreement. 
 
The criterion “utility” which is deemed to be synonymous with the term “industrial 
application” in article 27.1 TRIPS78 is fulfilled if the invention is operable and “capable 
of satisfying some function of benefit to humanity”.79 This definition is somewhat 
lower than the one in the EPC. The third requirement of TRIPS, namely inventive step, 
is mentioned in section 103 a) of the Patent Act. The invention must not be obvious for 
a person “having ordinary skills” in the art.80 Lastly, the patent application must contain 
a written enabling disclosure.81 For biological inventions, however, it is acknowledged 
to be sufficient to deposit the biological material.82  
 
As the Patent Act does not exclude plants it acknowledges patents for plants, in contrast 
to the EPC.83 However, only asexually produced “distinct and new varieties of plants” 
are covered by this section. Section 161 excludes uncultivated plants from patentability. 
Apart from that the normal criteria for patentability, namely novelty and utility, are to 
be applied.  
 
There is a comprehensive research of state of the art before a patent is granted.84 
Generally the patent examiners just have access to patent literature and older patents. 
Thus, information on public use or knowledge often is overlooked. Moreover, public 
use in foreign countries does not destroy novelty why it does not have to be examined. 
 
After the grant of a patent “any person at any time may cite to the Patent Office in 
writing prior art consisting of patents or printed publications” which is believed to bar 
patentability of a particular patent.85 Additionally in section 302 Patent Act any person 
at any time can file a request for re-examination of a patent on the basis of prior art cited 
                                                 
77 Section 102 b) Patent Act. 
78 footnote to article 27.1 TRIPS. 
79 Correa, IPR, note 22, at 60. 
80 „non obvious“ may be deemed to be synonymous with “inventive step” according to footnote 5 to 
article 27.1 of the TRIPS. 
81 Section 112 Patent Act. 
82 37 C.F.R. section 1.801 et sqq., available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ 
consolidated_rules.pdf.
83 Section 161 Patent Act. 
84 37 C.F.R. section 1.104 a) (1). 
85 Section 301 Patent Act. 
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under section 301. It must be mentioned that there is no possibility of re-examination on 
the basis of public use or knowledge. This has a particular effect on plant patents. 
Descriptions of plants generally do not meet the requirement of an enabling disclosure 
(section 112).86 That is why descriptions of plants alone cannot destroy novelty.87 On 
basis of public use of a plant there is no possibility of re-examination. Thus, an 
application of re-examination in the case of a plant patent just can be based on prior 
patents. 
 
A patent lasts 20 years in accordance with the relevant provision in the TRIPS 
agreement.88 The patentee has the exclusive right to make, use, offering for sale, sell 
and to import the patented invention in the United States as well as to prevent others 
from doing those actions.89 In the case of a plant patent, “the grant shall include the 
right to exclude others from asexually reproducing the plant, and from using, offering 
for sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any of its parts, throughout the United 
States, or from importing the plant so reproduced, or any parts thereof, into the United 
States”.90
c) Summary Patent systems 
As seen both the EPC and the US Patent Act exclude the grant of patents on natural 
products and genetic resources that are not modified by human beings because they are 
not seen as new or including an inventive step. However, biological material that is 
isolated, purified, or modified by a technical process is patentable in both systems91. 
Mere knowledge of the (medicinal etc.) effect of a genetic resource is not eligible for 
being patented. Theoretically, inventions that are based on genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge collected from indigenous communities are not patentable 
without any innovation and modification by the patent applicant. 
But there is the practical possibility in both patent systems that patents are granted 
although the requirements of patentability have not been met. The main reason is that 
the examiners in the patent offices when examining the state of the art are restricted to 
                                                 
86 Cf. section 162 Patent Act: “No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with section 
112 of this title if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.” The inversion of this argument 
is that generally descriptions of plants do not meet the requirements of section 112. 
87 Cf. 37 U.S.C. §1.906 a). 
88 Section 154. 2 Patent Act. 
89 Section 154 Patent Act. 
90 Section 163 Patent Act. 
91 Article 52 EPC, Rules 23 b – e of the Implementing Regulations; Section 101 Patent Act, U.S. Supreme 
Court, GRUR International 1980, at 627, 629. 
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sources that are accessible to them. Mainly these sources are written documents in 
patent literature. Inventions based on genetic resources and traditional knowledge are 
problematic since traditional knowledge is usually transferred orally from generation to 
generation and tends not to be written down. Under these circumstances it is practically 
impossible for the patent offices to consider traditional knowledge as state of the art 
because they normally do not have access to this information.  
Even if traditional knowledge is written down there is still the problem of access to 
these documents. It can be presumed that also traditional knowledge which was written 
down has not been published in patent literature. This kind of literature, however, is the 
main source of information for the patent offices. Another reason for the grant of those 
‘bad’ patents can be seen in the cost factor and time factor which restrict the 
examination.  
 
In the case of the US Patent Act the relative novelty with respect to the public use and 
knowledge in foreign countries combined with the lacking possibility of re-examination 
on the basis of public use could facilitate the grant of patents on inventions based on 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge that have been developed and used by 
indigenous communities for a long time. Although those patents meet the patentability 
requirements of the Patent Act, provided they are considered non-obvious and useful, 
they must be considered as ‘bad’ patents as well.  
 
Now it must be analyzed whether the patents which are claimed to be ‘bad’ patents were 
in fact granted unlawfully and whether the allegations against those patents are 
legitimate. 
d) Neem patent 
(1) Grant of the patent and opposition 
The neem tree is indigenous to the Indian subcontinent and parts of South and Southeast 
Asia.92 In 1994 the multinational corporation W.R. Grace and the US Department of 
Agriculture was granted a patent by the EPO “covering a (special) method for 
controlling fungi on plants by the aid of a hydrophobic extracted neem oil” that is 
                                                 
92 Shiva, note 34, at p. 7; Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4 at 76; Linda Bullard, ‘Freeing 




diluted with a certain percentage of water.93 The company claimed that the formulation, 
in contrast to the traditional one, is stable over a long period of time and that the 
processing of neem seeds involves steps that are novel.94  
 
On the 14.06.1995, nine months after the grant a member of the European Parliament of 
the Green Party joined by the Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and 
Natural Resource Policy from India and the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movement (IFOAM) based in Germany filed an opposition to this patent 
which mainly was based on the claim of lack of novelty and inventive step as well as on 
insufficient enabling disclosure.95 The opponents claimed “that the fungicidal effect of 
hydrophobic extracts of neem seeds was known and used for centuries on a broad scale 
in India” both in traditional medicine to fight human skin fungi and in agriculture to 
protect crops96. Even the concentration of neem oil in the emulsion that was claimed by 
the patent to be new had been discovered before.97 The same was said to be true for the 
“claimed method to produce the hydrophobic extracted neem oil”.98 Thus, the 
opponents claimed that the invention lacked the two major patentability requirements 
“novelty” and “inventive step”. Apart from that it was alleged that the neem patent 
violates old Indian traditions of sharing the neem tree and the knowledge related with it 
by allowing private ownership of this important resource.99 This privatization of 
traditional knowledge would threaten the livelihood of countless Indian farmers and 
indigenous cultures as many applications and products related with the neem tree as 
well as the evaluation of new uses would become illegal.100 The TRIPS agreement 
would enable the patent holder to enforce his patent worldwide with the result that the 
patentee would be able to claim exclusive use of neem even in India101. Moreover, the 
increasing demand for neem seeds by the W.R. Grace corporation had caused the prices  
                                                 
93 Shiva, note 34, at p.6; Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4 at 76; Gerard Downes, note 5, 
at 18; EPO document T 0416/01, available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/ 
t010416eu1.pdf.
94 Philip Schuler, ‘Biopiray and Commercialization of Ethnobotanical Knowledge’, in: J. Michael Finger 
and Philip Schuler (ed.), Poor People’s Knowledge Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries (2004),159-181, at 161, 162. 
95 Shiva, note 34, at p.6,7; Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 76; Bullard, note 92, at 3. 
96 Bullard, note 92, at 3; Shiva, note 34, at 7. 
97 Notice of opposition 14.05.1995 to patent EP0436257B1, available at epoline® Online Public File 
Inspection service http://ofi.epoline.org/view/GetDossier , at p. 4; Schuler, note 94, at 163 
98 Shiva, note 34, at 7; Schuler, note 94, at 162. 
99 Bullard, note 92, at 1; Shiva, note 34, at 7 
100 Luna, note 37, at 19. 
101 Folkins, note 5, at 345. 
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“to skyrocket beyond the reach of the ordinary people”.102  
(2) Decision of the European Patent Office 
In 2000, five years after filing the opposition, the Opposition Division of the EPO 
revoked the patent entirely.103 It based its ruling on the grounds that the submitted 
evidence had destroyed novelty and inventive step of the invention because it had 
shown prior public use respectively prior art with regard to inventive step.104 Even the 
auxiliary request of W.R. Grace and the US Department of Agriculture in which the 
concentration of the neem formulation was slightly changed as to fall just outside the 
range that was publicly used was rejected on the ground that it was lacking an inventive 
step.  
The issue was taken to the EPO’s Technical Board of Appeals, when W.R. Grace and 
the US Department of Agriculture appealed the decision in accordance with article 106 
EPC. On 08.03.2005 the body dismissed the appeal and decided to uphold the decision 
of the Opposition Division to revoke the patent in its entirety.105 The ruling was based 
on the lack of an inventive step .106
(3) Comment 
The invention claimed by the successfully challenged patent was indeed one based on a 
genetic resource of a Developing Country, the neem tree, and based on traditional 
knowledge related with that tree. The traditional knowledge used was the knowledge 
about the fungicidal effect of neem oil. The invention apparently did not involve a 
sufficient inventive step. Thus, it must be seen as a ‘bad’ patent. This example also 
shows that the examination process of the Patent Office was insufficient. With a little 
more effort the examiner must have noticed that neem fungicidals had been used in 
India for a long time and that the claimed extraction process was not fundamentally 
different from the traditional one. With regard to the opposition procedure of the EPO it 
can be determined that it is working to fight ‘bad’ patents, particularly because prior use 
in foreign countries can be a ground of a challenge. However, the deadline of nine 
months for notification of an opposition is quite short. Particularly for possible 
                                                 
102 Bullard, note 92, at 2. 
103 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4 at 76; Bullard, note 92, at 5; Shiva, note 34, at 7,8. 
104 Bullard, note 92, at 5; Shiva, note 34, at 7; Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4 at  76. 
105 Bullard, note 92, at 6. 
106 Notification of Decision to patent EP0436257B1 by the Boards of Appeal, 08.03.2005, available at 
epoline® Online Public File Inspection Service, confer note 97, at 25. 
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opponents from non EPC countries it is very difficult to learn of the patent in such a 
short period of time as the patent is not published in those countries. 
 
However, the allegations put forward need some comment.  
 
The argument that the patenting is a contradiction of the Indian practice of sharing the 
knowledge related with the neem tree and would affect the livelihood of Indian farmers 
reveals a misunderstanding of the effects and goals of Patent law. The Patent law was 
developed to stimulate innovation by rewarding the inventor with a monopoly for a 
limited period of time.107 It does not aim at goals of development politics.  
Moreover, the patent granted by the EPO would not have given the inventor any right 
on the neem tree itself or on the neem seeds. Such allegations brought against this 
patent are too far reaching.108 The patent just would have granted the patentee an 
exclusive right to make us of the patented invention, namely the special method of 
processing the emulsion and fighting fungi on plants, and to prevent others from doing 
so. However, the protection is strictly limited to the territory of the Contracting Parties 
of the EPC in respect of which the patent was granted. There is no worldwide 
enforcement of a patent; neither the EPC nor the US Patent Act can be enforced in other 
countries.109 Neither of both Patent laws give the patentee a right which would allow 
him to restrict or prohibit local communities in foreign countries the use of their genetic 
resources. Thus, the use of the neem tree or the neem seeds as well as the products in 
India which are based on them could not have been prohibited by the W.R. Grace 
patent. The local communities in India still would have been able to invent other 
products or processes related with the neem and to use them. They even could have used 
the patented invention without any restriction as long as there would not have been a 
patent in India on the same subject-matter. The tradition of freely sharing the neem tree 
still could have been carried on. Certainly Indian companies could not have been 
prevented from commercialising their own neem fungicides by the controversial patent. 
In fact they have produced neem based pesticides and sold it to the world market.110
 
Although W.R. Grace drew upon traditional knowledge of practices in India, the 
                                                 
107 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at p.5; 14.; David Downes, CIEL, note 6, at 3. 
108 vide: David Downes, CIEL, note 6, at 18. 
109 for the EPC vide Articles 3, 64 EPC. General principle that national laws cannot applied abroad 
(territorial principle); Gepts, note 18, at 1296; Correa, IPR, note 22, at 176. 
110 Schuler, note 94, at 165. 
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corporation nevertheless also used many industrial techniques that are in the public 
domain in industrialised countries. Thus, the inventor also used knowledge developed 
from other people or communities in respect of which nobody of the opponents 
complained about unauthorised exploitation. As Graham Dutfield stated correctly “if 
one argues that patenting of inventions based on traditional knowledge is exploitative of 
the indigenous communities, one also has to argue that it is inherently exploitative of all 
people past and present that had contributed to the state of the art relevant to the patent”. 
This position would be difficult to sustain as “state of the art includes… also the 
industrial techniques that can be applied to produce neem derivates that are in one way 
or another more useful than the natural product”.111 “In other words, traditional and 
Western technologies in the public domain were exploited equally”.112  
 
Besides, the neem patent is a good example to weaken the argument that taking genetic 
resources for producing a new product amounts to an exploitation of the genetic 
resources of indigenous communities.113 Genetic resources are quite difficult to assign 
to a specific “owner”. The neem tree, for example, is found in many countries what 
makes it virtually impossible to give one local community an “exclusive ownership” 
over this genetic resource. It could also be treated as being available for everyone. With 
traditional knowledge the same problem can arise if more than one local community has 
developed the same or very similar knowledge about a specific genetic resource.  
 
As to the allegation of rising prices because of the patent it must be stated that it is 
possible that an increasing demand for neem seeds has led to higher prices.114 But this 
problem is the effect of an increasing demand without higher supply and is not always 
and by all means connected with the grant of a patent. Even without patent protection 
corporations can invent something for which they need a natural substance. If this 
invention is successful the demand for this particular natural substance which is needed 
for the production of the invention will increase and therefore the price will rise as well. 
“Even if Indian firms had commercialised the new product, the same impact would have 
been observed”.115
                                                 
111 Dutfield in. Peter Drahos, note 6, at 141. 
112 David Downes, CIEL, note 6, at 18. 
113 ETC Group in: Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 74; Susan Sell, note 4, at 202; 
Dutfield, What is ‘biopiracy’?, note 4, at 1,3; Folkins, note 5, at  343; Gerard Downes, note 5, at 15. 
114 Bullard speaks of „skyrocketing prices“, Bullard, note 92, at 2; Schuler, note 94, at 165. 
115 Schuler, note 94, at 165. 
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Besides this negative impact there can be a positive effect of rising prices. There is a 
chance of rising income. Farmers, for example, could grow the natural substance (e.g. 
neem) that is demanded and earn an additional income which they would not have been 
able to achieve without that invention based on a genetic resource. Of course, not 
everybody who previously used the neem seeds will be able to profit from rising prices. 
Linda Bullard in her article refers to the healers and local oil millers who previously 
could access the neem seeds freely and now are not able to do it anymore due to higher 
prices.116 But as mentioned this particular problem of higher prices cannot be 
exclusively connected with the grant of a patent. The existing system of a free market 
economy must be blamed for.  
 
The allegation that the neem patent did not meet the statutory patentability requirements 
of inventive step and novelty can be ascertained to be true. Those accusations that the 
local communities would be prevented from using the neem tree as they did before are 
too far reaching. 
e) Turmeric Patent 
(1) Grant of the patent and opposition 
The plant Turmeric belongs to the ginger family.117 It has long been used predominantly 
in Asia as a spice and colouring agent as well as in the traditional Indian Ayurvedic 
medicine.118 In the medicinal context it has been traditionally used to treat a variety of 
ailments, particularly “to heal wounds and rashes”119 as Turmeric possesses an 
ingredient which is particularly effective in treating “inflammatory conditions”.120 In 
1995 the USPTO granted two Indian nationals at the University of Mississippi patent 
no. 5,401,504 for a “method of promoting healing of a wound in a patient” by 
“administering a wound healing agent consisting of an effective amount of turmeric 
powder”.121  
                                                 
116 Bullard, note 92, at 2. 
117 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 76. 
118 Schuler, note 94, at 166;  
119 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 76. 
120 Gerard Downes, note 5, at 18; World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), ‘Intellectual 
Property and Traditional Knowledge’, booklet no.2; available at: www.wipo.org/freepublications/en/tk/ 
920/wipo_pub_920.pdf at 28. 
121 WIPO, IP and TK, note 120, at 28; Schuler, note 94, at 167; Report of the British Commission on IPR, 
note 4, at 76; Gerard Downes, note 5, at  18; Tripathi, note 5, at. 4; J. Michael Finger, Introduction and 
Overview, in: J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler (ed.), Poor People’s Knowledge Promoting 
Intellectual Property in Developing Countries (2004), 1-36, at 22. 
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The patent applicants recognized the traditional use of turmeric in India but claimed that 
they had been the first who administered Turmeric powder orally and topically as a 
single agent modality for wound healing.122
This patent was challenged by the Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(“CSIR”) in 1996 on the ground of prior art.123 In the re-examination process the CSIR 
claimed “that turmeric has been used for thousands of years for healing wounds and 
rashes and therefore its medicinal use was not novel” and produced an old Sanskrit 
document as well as a scientific article published in 1953 in the Journal of the Indian 
Medical Association.124 Moreover the CSIR claimed that both the oral and the topically 
application of Turmeric powder for the purpose of healing wounds had been known. 
(2) Decision of the US Patent Office 
The USPTO upheld these objections and revoked the patent in its entirety in April 
1998.125 It based its decision on the grounds of lacking novelty and obviousness of the 
invention.126  
(3) Comment 
The Turmeric patent was based on genetic resources and traditional knowledge of a 
developing country and indeed it was not novel therefore it was a ‘bad’ patent. The 
claimed “invention” was the known traditional use of the plant. 
This case illustrates that ‘bad’ patents are often granted because prior art references are 
not available or even inaccessible to the patent office examiners.127 Most of traditional 
knowledge tends not to be written down therefore it cannot be examined by the Patent 
Office. At the time of the patent application the USPTO had no documentation available 
about possible prior art in other countries. Thus, it is important for developing countries 
to make accessible to the Patent Offices as much information and documentation as 
possible. But changing the examination process of the Patent Offices is just as urgent. It 
must be more comprehensive and include more databases, even from foreign countries. 
                                                 
122 WIPO, IP and TK, note 120, at 28; Schuler, note 94, at 167. 
123 Schuler, note 94, at 167; Tripathi, note 5, at 4; Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 76; 
David Downes, CIEL, note 6, at 18. 
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125 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 76; Tripathi, note 5, at 4; Schuler, note 94 at 167. 
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127 WIPO, IP and TK, note 120, at 28; Carlos M Correa, ‘Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual 
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However, in this case novelty could only be denied because the traditional use had been 
documented in written form. As mentioned above, the US Patent Act does not recognize 
prior use in foreign countries as prior art. This is a disadvantage for indigenous 
communities and developing countries that possess genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. The likelihood of ‘bad’ patents granted on such traditional use or 
knowledge is higher than under the rules of absolute novelty. At least the opposition 
provisions in the US Patent Act worked as they should and this ‘bad’ patent could be 
revoked. This decision was the “first time that a patent based on the traditional 
knowledge of a developing country had been successfully challenged”.128  
 
As to the effect of the patent it must be stated that the Indian local communities would 
not have been negatively affected by the patent, just as seen in the neem case. There 
would not have been an exploitation of those communities. The patent was confined to 
the exclusive right to use the claimed method and limited to the territory of the USA. 
The Indians could still have used the Turmeric for medicinal and other purposes. 
f) Ayahuasca Patent 
(1) Grant of the patent and opposition 
In 1986 Loren Miller, an American, obtained a plant patent granted by the USPTO to a 
variety of Banisteriopsis caapi.129 The so called Ayahuasca is a South American vine 
which is used in traditional rituals by indigenous Indian tribes for religious and 
medicinal purposes.130  
The applicant claimed that he had bred a new variety of Ayahuasca from samples which 
he had obtained from a indigenous family in Ecuador and that this variety, which he 
called “Da Vine”, “represented a new and distinct variety of B. caapi, primarily because 
of the flower colour” and leaf shape.131 The patentee never made commercial products 
from the plant.  
In 1994 the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin 
(“COICA”) became aware of the patent and organized protest against it. It objected to 
                                                 
128 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 76. 
129 Luna, note 37, at 6; Schuler, note 94, at 169;  
130 Manuel Ruiz Muller, Regulating Bioprospecting and Protecting Indigenous Peoples’ Knowledge in 
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Promilla Kapoor (ed.), Protecting And Promoting Traditional Knowledge: Systems, National Experiences 
And International Dimensions, UNCTAD 2004, 241-262, at 249; Wüger, note 1, at 193; Finger, note 121, 
at 26. 
131 Report of the British Commission on IPR, note 4, at 77; Luna, note 37, at 6; Schuler, note 94, at 169. 
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the patent because it would give foreign people rights to a plant of the Amazon basin 
that is regarded as sacred by many indigenous communities there.132 On behalf of this 
organisation the Center of International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) filed a re-
examination request at the US Patent Office. It was protested that the variety “Da Vine” 
was neither new nor distinct from known varieties. The plant had been widely known in 
literature in foreign countries and even was “identical to other specimen of Ayahuasca 
found in the U.S. herbarium collections”133. The variety was claimed not to be useful 
because it would violate the religious feelings of many indigenous communities 
therefore violating section 101 Patent Act.134  
(2) Decision of the US Patent Office 
In November 1999 the USPTO revoked the patent on the basis that the claimed variety 
was identical to other specimens in the U.S. herbarium collections, thus it was not novel 
and not distinct why the patent never should have been granted.135 The Patent Office, 
however, did not address the issue whether the sacred status of the Ayahuasca in the 
Amazon basin prevented its patentability on the grounds of non-utility.136  
After the patentee appealed the decision the USPTO reinstated the patent in 2001 on the 
grounds that there was not enough evidence to show non novelty.137 However, two 
years later, in June 2003, the 17 year protection period of the patent expired.138
(3) Comment 
The Ayahuasca plant patent was only granted on the basis of unique characteristics as 
the flower colour. Thus it did not include traditional knowledge or medicinal interesting 
compounds possibly contained in the plant and did not grant intellectual property rights 
with regard to these contents. The patent granted protection only to the variety “Da 
Vine” and to the asexually reproduction of this variety.139 “Da Vine” only was 
patentable because the US Patent law does not exclude plants from patentability as 
allowed under article 27.3 b) of the TRIPS agreement. Indeed it recognizes patents on 
                                                 
132 Schuler, note 94, at 170. 
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plants. Moreover it could only be granted because of the relative novelty definition in 
section 102 of the Patent Act. The plant features were not known in the USA and prior 
use in foreign countries could not be recognized by the USPTO according to the relative 
novelty definition.140 Additionally the problem that descriptions of plants generally do 
not destroy novelty because they do not meet the criteria of an enabling disclosure in 
section 112 became relevant in this case. 141  Although there arguably was scientific 
literature about the plant the USPTO did not regard it as destroying novelty. It just 
relied on the argument that the claimed variety could be found in herbarium collections, 
respectively could not be found in the collections when reinstating the patent. Luna in 
his article claims that the USPTO “conveys an inconstancy in” its actions by revoking a 
patent that “did not meet their own stated criteria”.142
 
Although the Ayahuasca patent was only based on the unique characteristics of the 
variety that was claimed to be new there were allegations that this patent would amount 
to a misappropriation of an important religious symbol and of a violation of sacred 
customs. One could concede that this criticism is partly true because, according to the 
provisions of the Patent Act, patents even could be granted on plants that are used for 
religious ceremonies by indigenous communities. Indeed, the USPTO in the Ayahuasca 
case “did not recognize claims that patents should not be granted to sacred plants”.143 
The Patent Act does not offer a solution for moral objections.144 But on the other hand a 
plant patent cannot in any case block the indigenous communities’ right to perform their 
traditional uses of the plant. An uncultivated plant in its status found in nature cannot be 
patented. Just asexually reproduced “new” and “distinct” varieties may be the subject of 
a plant patent. Even if the USPTO would grant a patent to a plant variety that is not new 
or distinct contrary to the provisions of the Patent Act the patentee just could exclude 
others from using the asexually reproduced plant, “or any of its parts”.145 The patent 
protection only covers the asexually reproduced variety claimed by the applicant, i.e. 
one variety within the whole Ayahuasca genus. Moreover the protection is limited to the 
territory of the United States. In no case indigenous communities in other countries 
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could be affected in their sacred customs. They could even use the “Da Vine” variety. 
Thus, the Ayahuasca patent cannot be seen as a violation of sacred traditional uses. 
According to Schuler the Ayahuasca patent also shows that “simply receiving a patent 
does not translate into their commercialization or preventing existing uses of a 
product”146. The patentee never made attempts to commercialise the patent at 
indigenous communities’ expense.  
 
Another argument can be put forward to support the patentability of genetic resources 
traditionally used in religious contexts. An exclusion of the patentability of those 
resources would be a legally unjustified preferential treatment. There would be an 
exclusive right (protection) in favour of genetic resources that are traditionally used in 
religious contexts. Such an exclusive right, however is criticised when it is granted by a 
patent. Moreover it would be difficult to draw a line which genetic resources are 
regarded as sacred and which not. The approach to make no differences at all seems to 
be fairer. 
g) Summary ‘bad’ patents 
In contrast to the allegations the main reason for the grant of ‘bad’ patents generally 
seems not to be the patentability requirements but the Patent Offices’ practice of novelty 
examination. Both the EPC and the US Patent Act theoretically require a comprehensive 
examination147 but in practice the research is confined to patent based information like 
patent literature.148 Moreover the examination is limited by economical and time 
reasons. And traditional knowledge tends not to be documented and therefore is almost 
impossible to access for Patent Offices. However, the relative novelty in the US Patent 
Act must be criticised for increasing the likelihood that a ‘bad’ patent is granted. In this 
respect one could also criticise the TRIPS agreement for allowing such a definition of 
novelty. 
 
As seen, neither the EPC nor the US Patent Act grant the patentee a right that would 
prevent local communities in developing countries from using their genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge. Patents do not have legal effect in foreign countries. Thus 
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patentees cannot prohibit the use, production and sale of their invention in other 
countries where they do not have a patent. The indigenous communities even could use, 
copy and sell the patentee’s invention in their country, at least as long as there is no 
patent on the invention.  
Against this background Schuler notes that it should be recognized that “simply 
awarding a patent in an industrial country generally does not cause economic harm to 
those who developed the traditional knowledge”.149 In “none of these cases had the new 
product displaced the traditional product in the developing country”.150  
The neem case is a good example for these statements. Even without patent protection 
the W.R. Grace Corporation could have “invented” the method of fighting fungi on 
plants and could have built factories that produce the neem oil emulsion and for which 
the neem seeds are needed. The traditional practices would not have been affected 
differently. Thus, a possible economic impact “comes from commercialization of 
products rather than awarding IPR protection”.151
In this respect ‘bad’ patents do not exploit indigenous communities or developing 
countries and the criticisms are exaggerated. 
 
In fact, many arguments that criticise patentability of genetic resources of developing 
countries or indigenous communities are therefore based on moral grounds. The patents 
are alleged to violate sacred customs inter alia. This criticism can be dismissed as well. 
Firstly, Patent Law was not developed to protect cultural traditions, thus it is a “poor 
instrument for blocking cultural degradation”.152 Secondly, as seen in the neem case, if 
one speaks about “exploitation” of knowledge, one has to keep in mind that generally 
both western and indigenous knowledge is being exploited by ‘biopiracy’ patents. There 
is no legal reason to treat biological inventions for which genetic resources of 
developing countries have been used in a different way as inventions based on genetic 
resources from developed countries. Apart from the fact that they originate in other 
parts of the world there is no significant difference. Both can be the basis of 
biotechnological inventions which must be patentable. This is being said particularly 
against the background that there is no direct exploitation related with those patents. 
The sacred traditions and customs related with the genetic resource can still be 
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performed as long as there is no (‘bad’) patent in the developing country itself. 
Moreover, there are many possibilities for a developing country to prevent a ’bad’ 
patent to be granted that are shown later in this thesis.  
 
There is, however, a negative economic impact for developing countries that can be 
connected with ‘bad’ patents. Based on his exclusive right the patentee can prevent the 
import of the patented invention into the country in which the patent was granted. 
According to article 28.1 TRIPS a patent must confer, among other rights, the right to 
prevent the import of the patented product or, “where the subject matter is a process” to 
prevent third parties from importing at least the product directly obtained by the 
patented. The USA and the markets of the European countries that are Contracting 
Parties of the EPC are important export markets for developing countries. The loss of 
these export markets and the loss of revenues appear possible. In a case where a patent 
was granted contrary to the Patent law provisions to an invention based on a genetic 
resource and traditional knowledge that was already known and used in developing 
countries, the loss of a possible or existent export market seems to be particularly 
painful. These ‘bad’ patents can be challenged but this procedure takes time and 
involves considerable costs. 153 Until there is a revocation of the ‘bad’ patent the 
patentee can prevent any “infringement” of the patent and block any unauthorised 
import. Valuable revenues for a developing country get lost. 
 
This particular problem, however, can occur in the case of properly granted patents as 
well. It is the purpose of Intellectual Property Rights to promote technological 
innovation and development by giving an inventor a monopoly for a limited period of 
time and thus awarding him for his innovation. In return, the innovation becomes public 
knowledge after the time of protection and is accessible for everyone for other 
inventions. In contrast to the grant of a ‘bad’ patent the properly granted patent is novel 
invention that is just derived from genetic resources or traditional knowledge. Thus, the 
indigenous communities or companies from the developing countries could still export 
their traditional products without infringing the granted patent. In this case there is not 
the same danger of losing export revenues. The problem her is that the ‘old’ traditional 
invention has to compete with a ‘new’ one. This situation, however, is a normal process 
in an economy when new, presumably better, products are invented and compete with 
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other products. Therefore, there is no sound legal reason to treat proper patents on 
inventions derived from genetic resources or traditional knowledge different from 
“usual” biotechnological inventions. If a patent is granted to a microbiological process, 
for example, this process and products directly obtained by this particular process 
cannot be imported without the authorisation of the patentee.154 In this respect there is 
not as much criticism regarding the exclusive rights of a patentee. Additionally one has 
to keep in mind that companies from developing countries as well as the indigenous 
communities can also patent inventions based on their own genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge and profit from the import ban. Of course, considering that those 
countries generally do not have the same technological basis as more advanced 
countries, it is more difficult for them to profit. However, they could and should make 
use of the technological knowledge that is freely available in Western countries, either 
never patented or now in the public domain, to create new inventions based on their 
own knowledge and genetic resources. Developing countries can adjust their national 
legislation for this purpose as shown later in chapter VI. 
 
As to the allegation that transnational corporations are the main beneficiaries of 
‘biopiracy’, Dutfield notes in his article: “It is not the fault of the patent system per se 
that the main beneficiaries from trade in products derived from genetic resources appear 
to be corporations” from technologically advanced countries. “In the absence of a patent 
system, corporations would most probably still dominate this trade”.155
2. ‘Good’ Patents 
The criticism that is related to ‘good’ patents does not refer to the actual grant of the 
patent. It is concerned with the allegation that those genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge that are the basis of an invention have been obtained illegally in violation of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) without prior informed consent of the 
developing country or indigenous community concerned and that the indigenous 
community is not given a share in the benefits arising out of the commercialisation of 
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155 Dutfield in: Peter Drahos, note 6, at 145. 
 
 31
that invention156. This practice would amount to an “uncompensated exploitation of 
their plant genetic resources” and is characterised as ‘biopiracy’.157  
The developing countries and indigenous communities argue “that they have an 
entitlement to their plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge” and that they are 
the ‘root source’ of the invention what would give them a right to be compensated158. 
Most of the corporations that use those genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
deny any legal obligation to compensate local communities from which they obtained 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge159. For them traditional knowledge is in the 
public domain which is freely accessible to everyone160. Sarma also alleges that 
“transnational corporations enjoy large profits” from “products created by indigenous 
knowledge”.161  
a) Hoodia Case 
(1) Case and opposition 
A very well known case that is concerned with those allegations is the Hoodia plant 
Case. The San people, indigenous inhabitants of Southern Africa, “have traditionally 
eaten” stems of the Hoodia plant “to stave off hunger and thirst on long hunting 
trips”.162 Hoodia is a succulent plant that is indigenous to the semi-arid areas of 
Southern Africa.163 After the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in South 
Africa (“CSIR”) had identified and extracted the ingredient of the plant that acts as an 
appetite suppressant it applied for a patent on this active agent called P57 for different 
countries in accordance with the PCT.164 The CSIR in its application claimed both “a 
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process for preparing an extract of a plant … of the genus Hoodia … comprising an 
appetite suppressant agent” and the extract itself, respectively a composition of the 
extract. Even “a method of suppressing an appetite by administering … an effective 
dosage of a composition as claimed” should be covered by the patent.165 Dolder notes 
that the invention hardly contained any new “intellectual input” compared to the 
traditional knowledge used.166
In 1997 the CSIR came to an agreement with the UK pharmaceutical corporation 
Phythopharm in which the later received the licence for further development and 
commercialisation of the active agent of the Hoodia plant.167 Phytopharm announced in 
1998 that it had sold its licence to the US company Pfizer for $32 million in royalty and 
milestone payments.168 When the San learned from that case in 2001 the then 
established ‘South African San Council’ spoke of ‘biopiracy’. It “claimed that their 
traditional knowledge had been stolen and CSIR had failed to comply with the rules of” 
the Convention on Biological Diversity.169 The San claimed a fair share of the benefits 
arising from the commercialisation of P57. 
(2) Reach of an agreement 
Urged by international pressure CSIR entered an agreement with the San Council in 
March of 2003. The agreement provided for a 8% share of milestone payments, “a 
payment to be made by CSIR’s licencee Phytopharm during the drug’s clinical 
development” and for a 6% share of the royalties CSIR will receive when the drug 
derived from P57 is being marketed.170 This benefit sharing agreement attracted 
criticism immediately. One of the criticisms relates to the small payment that that the 
San will receive. It was estimated that they will receive “less than 0,003% of net sales of 
the product, which will come from the CSIR’s share” whereas Pfizer and Phythopharm 
will not pay anything. The fair distribution of the payments among the San in the 
different countries in Southern Africa was seen as problematic.171
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Although the figure of 0,003% of the net sales appears to be very small at the first 
glance, the sum that could be received could still be substantial as the potential market 
for an anti-obesity drug is possibly considerable.172 Thus, the IPR Commission came to 
the conclusion that the “case would appear to demonstrate that with goodwill on all 
sides, mutually acceptable arrangement for access and benefit sharing can be agreed”.173 
However, in 2003 Pfizer decided to cease the clinical development of P57 and returned 
its sub-licence back to Phytopharm.174 Since 2004, a Hoodia preparation coming 
directly from South Africa is marketed by Canadian and US companies which share a 
portion of the net sales with the San people.175  
b) Legal basis for benefit sharing / prior informed consent 
The TRIPS agreement as the main legal framework for Intellectual Property Rights is 
not concerned with how genetic resources should be collected nor does it require prior 
informed consent of the indigenous community or developing country for patentability 
of inventions based on genetic resources or traditional knowledge. TRIPS also does not 
provide for compelling benefit sharing when a patent was granted to an invention 
derived from genetic resources or traditional knowledge. From this it follows that 
neither the EPC nor the US Patent Act provide such provisions. 
Thus, it is uncertain on which legal basis the claimed requirement of prior informed 
consent and the right of benefit sharing could be grounded. 
 
Many proponents of the requirement of prior informed consent and the right of benefit 
sharing refer to a violation of the CBD when genetic resources have been collected 
without prior informed consent or no benefit sharing has been agreed on.176 Indeed, the 
CBD in its articles 3 and 15.1 declares that states have sovereign rights over their 
genetic resources and have the right to regulate access to them in national law.177 
Article 15.5 requires “that access to genetic resources should be subject to prior 
informed consent” of the respective country in which genetic resources are being 
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collected.178 This expression could indicate that there is an obligation to prove ‘prior 
informed consent’. 
With respect to benefit sharing the CBD is more reserved. Article 15.7 CBD 
‘encourages’ the equitable and fair sharing of benefits derived from the use of genetic 
resources under mutually agreed terms. Regarding the utilisation of traditional 
knowledge article 8 j CBD also just ‘encourages’ benefit sharing179. The Convention’s 
language in respect of benefit sharing is not compulsory but leaves ample discretion to 
the contracting parties. It is debatable whether article 8j confers a right to the holders of 
traditional knowledge. 
 
Another problem regarding the presumption of a legal basis stems from the nature of the 
CBD as an international treaty. It just binds its contracting parties, i.e. states, and not 
individuals.180 It does not confer rights or obligations on private individuals.181 The 
obligations and rights provided for in the CBD must be transferred in national law 
before they can be applied to individuals and before individuals can claim rights182. As 
long as there is no national legislation in this regard indigenous communities cannot 
claim a right to benefit sharing nor is there an obligation to obtain prior informed 
consent from the indigenous community when collecting their genetic resources. 
 
A more general problem regarding the application of the obligations and rights in the 
CBD stems from the controversial issue of the relationship between the CBD and the 
TRIPS agreement. Some countries argue that there is a contradiction between TRIPS 
and the CBD with regard to the provisions on access to genetic resources and benefit 
sharing in which the CBD would prevail.183 Some others, particularly from the 
developed world, deny any connection between the CBD and TRIPS.184 Every 
obligation of ‘prior informed consent’ or ‘benefit sharing’ in patent law would have to 
match with the TRIPS regulations. This controversy has not been settled up to now. 
Since this thesis does not deal with this issue, this question will not be discussed further. 
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Even in the case of a contradiction one could argue in accordance with the international 
principles for interpretation of a treaty codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969 that the TRIPS agreement as the later treaty prevails185.  
 
So far regulations on prior informed consent or benefit sharing are not provided for by 
the TRIPS agreement. Thus, any national legislation in accordance with the CBD that 
provides for such an obligation or right in its intellectual property rights law must be 
examined whether it is compatible with the TRIPS agreement. That will be done in the 
next chapter when analyzing in which ways developing countries can prevent 
‘biopiracy’. 
 
Based on the arguments mentioned above one can state that indigenous communities do 
not have a legal basis for their claim to benefit sharing or prior informed consent as long 
as there is no national legislation that transfers the CBD provisions in a manner that is 
compatible with the TRIPS agreement. In this respect patents on inventions based on 
traditional knowledge or genetic resources are not obtained illegally. 
c) Moral grounds for benefit sharing / prior informed consent 
The claims to benefit sharing and prior informed consent are also based on moral 
arguments.186 There is the picture of exploitation of indigenous communities and of the 
developing country as a whole by transnational corporations from technological more 
advanced countries that successfully commercialise patented products derived from 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge that did not belong to them.187 It is claimed 
that indigenous communities contribute to an invention by providing either genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge, sometimes both, but are in no way awarded for their 
contribution. This situation is considered as being inequitable.  
 
Developing countries and indigenous communities as well are in a dilemma. They do 
not have the same financial and technological resources to make use of Intellectual 
Property Law and to profit from their own genetic resources and knowledge by 
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inventing new products. On the other hand technologically more advanced countries can 
extend their advantage with the help of patents and other intellectual property rights. 
This brings, respectively holds developing countries in a weak position in worldwide 
trade. Thus, the criticism of ‘biopiracy’ is arguably a general complaint about their 
current status in worldwide trade. The demand to participate in the profits of western 
corporations which are partly favoured by the contributions of indigenous communities 
might be legitimate and understandable. 
 
However, arguing on moral basis in the context of Intellectual Property Rights Law is 
problematic. Patent Law neither aims at rewarding contributions to inventions nor does 
it regulate access to resources that are not protected by patents. In this respect 
Intellectual Property Law does not know moral arguments. Neither is TRIPS nor are 
national Patent Laws equipped to deal with moral arguments for benefit sharing. TRIPS 
in article 27.2 provides for an exception to patentability if the commercialisation of an 
invention is contrary to “morality”188 but it does not provide for an obligation of the 
patentee based on morality to share the benefits that accrue from the invention. 
Arguably IPR law is not the right place to deal with such moral arguments. 
 
Moreover there are also counter-arguments that could be put forward against a moral 
obligation to share benefits with indigenous communities that have contributed genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge.  
As mentioned in the neem case, inventors of inventions derived from genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge of indigenous communities certainly draw upon knowledge 
that originated from local communities. But at the same time they also make use of 
many practices and knowledge that are in the public domain in industrialised countries, 
such as biotechnological techniques, either because they never were patented or patents 
had expired. One could say that in both cases technologies and knowledge that are 
available in the public domain are being exploited “without compensating those who 
originated them or their descendants”.189 Thus, it is supposed that traditional knowledge 
as every other knowledge is part of the public domain. Knowledge in the public domain,  
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however, is generally seen as freely accessible.190 If the patentability requirements are 
applied accurately, the inventor must prove sufficient own creativity to obtain a patent. 
The changes to a genetic resource or traditional knowledge therefore must be significant 
to speak of an inventive step and novelty. If this is the case and patents are granted 
properly one could argue that there is no moral basis to demand benefit sharing as the 
new invention cannot be said to be one of the indigenous community. Rewarding the 
inventor only seems not to be illegitimate. Furthermore it appears to be “impossible to 
attribute an objective economic value overall” to the knowledge and the genetic 
resources that are contributed by the indigenous community.191 For that reason David 
Downes proposes that an implementation of a benefit sharing provision in accordance 
with article 8j CBD should orientate itself to “the costs incurred by the indigenous 
community concerning their knowledge and biodiversity, rather than” to the value of 
it.192
One also has to keep in mind that there is a significant number of voluntary benefit 
sharing agreements between corporations and indigenous communities though 
particularly the Rural Advancement Foundation International criticises most of those 
agreements heavily.193 The existence of voluntary benefit sharing could weaken the 
allegation that there is no benefit sharing. 
 
These arguments demonstrate that it is almost impossible to argue firmly on moral 
grounds. There are always two sides and arguments in favour as well as against each of 
them. Moreover, morality can be defined in many different ways and in fact is defined 
variously in different countries. 194 There is not one single worldwide accepted 
definition. Thus, “it is impossible to deduce a single fair and equitable IPR system from 
the general human rights principle available to us” as David Downes notes correctly.195  
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One must conclude that the claim for a right to benefit sharing cannot be decided on 
moral grounds either. There are arguments in favour as well as against such a “right”. 
Thus, the claims relating to an obligation of ‘prior informed consent’ and a right of 
‘benefit sharing’ cannot be validated. Firstly, there is no legal right unless the CBD 
provisions mentioned have been transformed in national law in a manner compatible 
with TRIPS. Secondly, it is by no means clear that indigenous communities can rely on 
moral obligations.  
However, it will be shown that developing countries can nevertheless provide for 
compulsory benefit sharing with the help of suitable legislation outside Intellectual 
Property Law, namely in connection with regulations on access to genetic resources. 
Thus, the criticisms regarding ‘good’ patents are exaggerated as well. 
V. Intermediate Result 
As illustrated by the cases in chapter IV B) ‘bad’ patents have been granted under types 
of patent law as stipulated by the TRIPS agreement. The flexibility of TRIPS 
contributes to this problem since it does not prevent countries from defining novelty in a 
way that does not recognize traditional use in foreign countries as prior art. But as seen, 
for example, in the Turmeric case the main reasons for the grant of ‘bad’ patents are the 
non availability of documentation of traditional knowledge and the poor examination of 
novelty by the Patent Offices.  
 
The relative broad flexibility of defining the patentability requirements makes it also 
possible that patents are granted for inventions that arguably do not involve significant 
own creativity. It could be the case that the ‘inventor’ mixes “scientific and technical 
expertise with certain aspects of the appropriated traditional knowledge or with the 
extracted active ingredient from native biological resources” and is able to obtain a 
patent196. Whether this mixture involves a sufficient inventive step that is worthy 
enough be patented or not or whether traditional knowledge should only be patented by 
its ‘creators’ is a question of ethics and morality. IPR law, however, is generally not 
concerned with morality197. If the invention meets the requirement of inventive step as 
stipulated in the respective patent law it should be ‘worth’ obtaining a patent though it 
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also used aspects of traditional knowledge. There is no significant difference to the case 
where an inventor used other knowledge in the public domain. 
Moreover, the same flexibility of TRIPS gives developing countries freedom to adjust 
their patent laws in a way that does prevent the grant of ‘bad’ patents at least in their 
territory and to develop a patent law that acknowledges their needs. Furthermore there 
are some limits in defining the patentability requirements of TRIPS. It would appear 
that the normal meaning of the words “novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability” are the outer limits of defining them. Applied in a proper way, patents on 
inventions derived from genetic resources and traditional knowledge should only be 
eligible if they in fact contain an inventive step and are not just “plagiarisms”.  
 
Even despite the ‘bad’ patents indigenous communities are not prevented to use their 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge as they have always done in the past. There 
is no violation of ‘sacred customs’ or other traditions. They could even try to profit 
from the “new” product or invent similar products. The economical effect of raising 
prices in the case of neem seeds could not be traced back to the grant of the patent. As 
far as this goes there is no injury or exploitation of the indigenous communities and 
developing countries through ‘bad’ patents. The criticisms in this respect are 
exaggerated. 
 
Thus, it is more about moral allegations and moral obligations. This is also 
demonstrated by the discussion about benefit sharing which is more concerned with 
arguments based on morality than with one based on law. The supposed problems 
relating to ‘bad’ and ‘good’ patents refer only partially to patent law. Moral arguments, 
however, are no sound basis for the claimed “right” of benefit sharing. Indeed it is 
problematic to argue on moral grounds if one wants to ascertain a legal right. Thus a 
right to benefit sharing could not be determined. 
 
The discussion about ‘biopiracy’ appears to be only one aspect of the wider topic of 
biodiversity protection and the worry about a just distribution of the benefits arising 
from its use and commercialisation. This discussion is therefore closely linked with the 
“old” conflict between developing and more developed countries which exists 
particularly in the context of worldwide trade and the issue of equal opportunities.  
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Patent law is not able to solve this kind of problems. Intellectual property rights cannot 
satisfy such needs since they were not developed for such purposes. Indigenous 
communities have protected and transferred their traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources over thousands of years without legal protection. So it might be assumed that 
they will do it in future as well despite an apparently “unfair” intellectual property 
system. 
 
However, there are negative impacts on developing countries and indigenous 
communities that are related with ‘biopiracy’ and problems of intellectual property 
rights law that facilitate these problems. 
 
There is the problem of losing export markets when a ‘bad’ patent is granted to an 
invention derived from genetic resources and traditional knowledge. Since the patent is 
the traditional invention itself the indigenous community or anybody else from the 
developing country that has traditionally used this invention cannot continue to export 
the traditional invention to the country in which the ‘bad’ patent was granted without 
infringing this patent. The patent gives the patentee the right to prevent the import of the 
patented invention without his authorisation198. Even with correctly granted patents a 
similar problem can arise. The traditional invention can still be exported but now the 
traditional product has to compete with a new patented product which has been derived 
from the traditional one and for which the indigenous community has not obtained any 
compensation although it had contributed the genetic resource and often related 
traditional knowledge as well.  
 
As mentioned above the TRIPS agreement allows relative novelty definition which 
facilitates the possibility of granting patents that are essentially plagiarism of traditional 
knowledge although this is not the main reason for the grant of ‘bad’ patents.  
 
Another aspect has to be addressed in this context. Until now the problems that 
‘biopiracy’ causes have been dealt with but not how much ‘biopiracy’ actually occurs. 
From this question depends how heavily the developing countries and indigenous 
communities are in fact affected by ‘bad’ and ‘good’ patents. In this respect there are, of 
course, different opinions. Some authors claim that there is widespread bioprospecting 
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and thus ‘biopiracy’ taking place in developing countries199 whereas most authors 
conclude as Dutfield does that it is “by no means clear how much ‘biopiracy’ actually 
goes on”.200 He and others state that “there are very little data” but pharmaceutical 
corporations would generally consider themselves to be less dependent than ever on 
natural product research.201 Kate and Laird in their study found out that the commercial 
demand for traditional knowledge and genetic resources is decreasing.202 The former 
Minister of the Environment in Colombia stated that the “great demand for access to the 
genetic resources” of the developing countries in South America which was foreseen 
has not happened.203 Altogether it can be ascertained that there is a lack on information 
on how much ‘bad’ patents or ‘good’ patents have been granted. Moreover, this also 
depends on how one distinguishes between legitimate and unfair exploitation. The 
extent to which the few impacts of ‘biopiracy’ mentioned above occur therefore cannot 
be ascertained. Thus it might be “possible to be too concerned about ‘biopiracy’.204
 
In sum one can state that the main impact related with ‘biopiracy’ on indigenous 
communities and developing countries is the possible loss of export markets, 
particularly in the case of a ‘bad’ patent. The main reason for the grant of ‘bad’ patents 
is the non availability of documentation of traditional knowledge and the poor 
examination of novelty by the Patent Offices. The grant of ‘bad’ as well as ‘good’ 
patents without compensation is facilitated by the flexibility of TRIPS with main regard 
to the definition of the patentability requirements. However, a right of indigenous 
communities to benefit sharing or to require prior informed consent could not be found. 
VI. Possibilities for developing countries under TRIPS 
In this chapter it will be demonstrated that developing countries can adjust their national 
legislation in a way as to avoid the few negative impacts of ‘biopiracy’ mentioned 
above. They are able to prevent the granting of ‘bad’ patents in their own territory as 
well as to prevent largely the grant of such patents in other countries. They could 
therewith prevent the negative economic impact of loss of a possible export market as 
well as the alleged exploitation of indigenous communities and developing countries 
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though this was shown to be an unjustified accusation. They even can require prior 
informed consent and benefit sharing agreements if foreign corporations want to use 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge from the respective developing country. This 
can be done in the context of regulations on access to those resources. Moreover 
developing countries could make the TRIPS like IPR system work to economically 
benefit them and their indigenous communities. One must, however, keep in mind that 
national legislation in Intellectual Property Rights Law must be consistent with the 
TRIPS agreement which “mandates the level of protection of intellectual property 
rights”.205  
A. Proposals for regulations with national effect 
These proposals aim at adjusting the national IPR law in order to prevent the granting of 
‘bad’ and ‘good’ patents in the developing countries’ own territory. The goal should be 
only to grant proper patents as well as to obtain prior informed consent of the 
indigenous community or the state itself before genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge can be used and to provide for compelling benefit sharing.  
1. Prior informed consent in patent legislation 
One proposal that is often given is that national Patent law could require the patent 
applicant to prove prior informed consent of the party that provided genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge for the invention. This requirement could be limited to inventions 
where “natural genetic resources are employed” and active components have not been 
isolated from those resources.206 That restriction, however, is not compelling. A more 
comprehensive construction would also cover inventions that are derived from genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge.  
Additionally an obligation to share the benefits arising out of the commecialisation of 
the patent could be linked with the prior informed consent requirement. The 
requirement of prior informed consent would prevent the “missappropriation of 
traditional knowledge” and genetic resources by means of patents “against the will of  
the indigenous communities”207. Thus it would avoid the problems related to ‘good’ 
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 patents. However, it would not prevent the acquisition and commercialisation of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge by third parties without obtaining a patent. 
This case could be covered by other legislation that is presented later (access 
regulations). 
 
However, the definition of the “PIC” requirement as an “additional substantive 
requirement for patentability” arguably contravenes the provisions of the TRIPS 
agreement. Article 27.1 TRIPS contains the statutory patentability conditions, namely 
‘novelty’, ‘inventive step’ and ‘industrial applicability’. Exceptions are only provided in 
article 27.2 and 27.3 with regard to the scope of patentability, respectively in article 
65.4 and article 70.8 with regard to the implementation time. In other respects article 
27.1 states clearly that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination”. Thus it would seem that the substantive patentability requirements are 
finally regulated in article 27.1 TRIPS where a requirement of prior informed consent is 
not included. Moreover, prior informed consent is not covered by the flexibility that 
TRIPS leaves in defining the patentability requirements. The conditions in article 27.1 
all “refer to the invention per se, i.e. they result from the technical characteristics of the 
invention”.208 The requirement of prior informed consent, however, would not refer to 
the invention itself. Since there is no exception of article 27.2 or 27.3 evident, this 
requirement cannot be included as a patentability condition209.  
 
Visser, however, argues that lacking prior informed consent could be a ground to revoke 
a patent.210 Both Visser and Correa hold that TRIPS does not provide for grounds for 
revocation of a patent therefore it would “not limit the grounds on which such a 
decision may be adopted”.211 Instead of a revocation Visser also proposes the transfer of 
the patent to the successful revocation applicant.212 Article 32 TRIPS indeed does not 
provide grounds for revocation of a patent. However, grave arguments militate against 
the compatibility of both suggestions with the TRIPS Agreement. The systematic 
connection of article 32 and its position after the patentability requirements would rather 
speak for the interpretation that a revocation should only be possible on grounds of non-
compliance with a patentability requirement in article 27 or the disclosure requirement 
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in article 29. If any ground would be sufficient to revoke a patent, the patentability 
requirements of TRIPS in article 27.1 would be seriously undermined. The prior 
informed consent requirement could indirectly become a patentability requirement 
although it is acknowledged that such a condition would be incompatible with article 
27.1 TRIPS. Moreover, Carvalho cites the negotiation history of article 32 as an 
argument against the compatibility of prior informed consent as a revocation 
criterion.213  
 
Thus one must conclude that the requirement of prior informed consent cannot be 
included in national Patent legislation neither as a patentability requirement nor as a 
revocation ground due to a contradiction of the TRIPS agreement. 
An interesting alternative is given by Carvalho who proposes that a patent that was 
granted without prove of prior informed consent should be deemed not enforceable.214 
Article 8 of the TRIPS would allow for such an interpretation. One could again argue 
that the practical effect of such an interpretation would be the same as if prior informed 
consent would be a patentability requirement. The patent would lose its economical 
advantage. Thus this proposal also could be deemed to be incompatible with TRIPS.  
 
However, as it is shown later, developing countries can provide for such a requirement 
in legislation outside IPR law, namely in regulations on access to genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge. 
2. Disclosure of the country of origin in patent legislation 
In order to prevent ‘bad’ patents and in order to have a basis for the requirement of 
benefit sharing it has been suggested to expand the disclosure requirement in article 29 
as to cover the country of origin of genetic resources or traditional knowledge.215 If the 
patent applicant would fail to meet this requirement the patent either could not be 
granted or the revocation of a granted patent would be possible.216 The disclosure 
requirement “would have the advantage of legally forcing patent applicants to double 
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check prior art in their field”.217 The patent offices could more easily examine prior art 
when they know that traditional knowledge and genetic resources have been used and 
where those originated.  
 
Again it is controversial whether this requirement is consistent with TRIPS.218 Article 
29 and 62.1 are the relevant provisions. Disclosure according to article 29 requires that a 
person skilled in the art can carry out the invention therefore it mainly “aims at ensuring 
the reproducibility of the invention”.219 The disclosure of the source of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, however, is not necessary to carry out the 
invention, thus it has no direct relation to article 29. Neither is this requirement covered 
by article 27. According to article 62.1 TRIPS “members may require … compliance 
with reasonable procedures”, provided they are “consistent with the provisions of this 
agreement”. Carvalho refers to the negotiation history and argues soundly that 
“reasonableness” implies procedures that support the Patent Offices in identifying and 
assessing the “substantive conditions of patentability” in articles 27 and 29220. A 
requirement of disclosure of the source of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, 
however, does not help the Patent Offices in examining whether the invention is new or 
inventive or whether the disclosure according to article 29 is precise enough. 
Furthermore one could argue that the disclosure requirement contravenes the non-
discrimination principle in article 27.1 as it only refers to inventions that used genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge221.  
 
Thus, this disclosure requirement cannot be included in Patent Law either. A possible 
voluntary disclosure of the source of genetic resources without any sanctions appears to 
be worthless as probably few inventors would observe it.  
3. Use of the flexibility and exceptions to patentability in the TRIPS 
agreement 
The British Commission on Intellectual Property Rights recommended that developing 
countries should allow as few biotechnological patents as possible and thus should 
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make use of the exceptions to patentability allowed in the TRIPS agreement.222 They 
could avoid patents on traditional knowledge and genetic resources almost entirely 
therefore ‘bad’ patents could not emerge either. Patents like the Ayahuasca example 
could be prevented. Developing countries should prohibit the patentability of plants, 
animals, plant varieties, essential biological processes and of “biological materials 
found in nature, even if isolated therefrom”.223 Microbiological processes and micro-
organisms must be patentable though.224 Since the TRIPS Agreement does not define 
any of these terms countries have considerable leeway to manoeuvre. They should 
therefore define the mentioned terms of ‘micro-organisms’ and ‘microbiological 
processes’ as restrictive as possible in order to exclude as much biotechnological 
inventions as possible from patentability. Moreover the ‘morality’ exception could be 
used to counter the alleged violation of ‘sacred customs’ although this criticism was 
seen as unjustified in chapter IV.  As the notion of morality is not defined uniformly but 
“is relative to the values prevailing in a society” patent examiners “could be directed to 
consider the extent to which the patent application” might infringe special cultural or 
religious feelings of indigenous communities in the country.225 In a case of ‘violation’ 
the patentability could be refused. Such a decision based on the morality exception 
cannot be challenged under the WTO dispute settlement system, “unless it is clearly 
beyond the reasonable meaning of the concept of ‘morality’ ”.226
 
The requirement of ‘novelty’ should be defined carefully as to contain an absolute 
novelty standard and should be examined carefully in patent applications. This is 
another element to prevent the grant of ‘bad’ patents. The same is true for the 
patentability requirement ‘inventive step’. A high standard ensures that inventions 
involving increments to traditional knowledge and minimal creative input cannot be 
patented therefore the question whether mixtures between western techniques and 
traditional knowledge are worthy to be patented would not arise.227 The inventor would 
have to prove sufficient own creativity why his invention should be patentable without 
any problems. Encouraging domestic innovation could be facilitated with the provision 
of exceptions to patent rights for teaching, private and non-commercial as well as 
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experimentation purposes.228 This could lead to more domestic inventions based on own 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge what would further decrease the fear of 
‘exploitation’.  
4. Sui generis protection of traditional knowledge 
A sui generis protection of traditional knowledge could be another possibility for 
developing countries. With the help of such an intellectual property protection they 
could provide for benefit sharing with indigenous communities and require prior 
informed consent and could thus avoid any discussion about ‘good’ patents. The TRIPS 
Agreement does not provide for a special system for traditional knowledge, on the other 
hand it does not prohibit sui generis protection either.229 Even developed countries that 
generally are critical of interpreting TRIPS broadly have not contested the possibility to 
provide a specific traditional knowledge protection system.230  
 
The CBD’s Panel of Experts on Access and Benefit-sharing proposed inter alia the 
recognition of sui generis ‘intellectual community rights’ that indigenous communities 
can obtain over traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.231 Those rights 
could include “a right to prevent the unauthorised use of traditional knowledge, and a 
right to prevent any reproduction of a fixation of traditional knowledge that is 
unauthorised or distorting”.232 The legislation could also provide “administrative and 
judicial review processes to resolve disputes, benefit sharing mechanisms, and registers 
of traditional knowledge.233 One of the main tasks for the composition of such a system 
would be the precise definition of traditional knowledge that is to be protected. There 
are many alternatives and possibilities to form such a sui generis system. Countries are 
free to adopt a system which effectively takes into account the special needs and 
characteristics of the country. 
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Visser in his article introduces an interesting proposal which he names “compensatory 
liability regime”.234 Under this system ‘first comers’ of (small scale) innovations on 
traditional knowledge, i.e. indigenous communities, are “entitled to a reasonable royalty 
from third parties who commercially exploit” these contributions without prior 
informed consent.235 The goal of this system is to reward the indigenous community for 
its first contribution (traditional knowledge) as well as the “second comers, i.e. those 
who build on the community’s cultural heritage, without impeding access to the public 
domain or the flow of new products”.236 This kind of system provides both benefit 
sharing for the indigenous community but at the same time allows corporations to use 
indigenous communities’ genetic resources and traditional knowledge to invent another 
product which they can sell. Thus both sides could be satisfied and the criticisms related 
to ‘good’ patents be prevented.  
One must, however, consider that with a sui generis protection system traditional 
knowledge would be given more rights than other knowledge in the public domain.  
 
With the help of these proposals developing countries can avoid the alleged problem of 
‘biopiracy’ patents to emerge in their own countries. They can provide for an IPR 
system that protects indigenous communities and traditional knowledge related to 
genetic resources.  
B. Proposals for regulations with international effect 
The effects of the proposals mentioned above are restricted to the territory of the 
respective country. They would not affect the Patent legislation and the manner of 
granting patents in other countries like the US or European countries where ‘bad’ and 
‘good’ patents have been granted. Those countries would have to enact own legislation 
that, for example, provide for benefit sharing.  
With the help of legislation outside intellectual property law developing countries can 
fight the impacts of ‘biopiracy’ and prevent the granting of ‘bad’ patents in foreign 
countries though.  
                                                 
234 Visser, note 3, at 231, 232. 
235 Ibid. at 231. 
236 Ibid. at 231. 
 
 49
1. Databases of traditional knowledge 
A recommendation which has been submitted many times237 and that could be very 
useful from my point of view to prevent the granting of ‘bad’ patents in foreign 
countries is the development of “traditional knowledge digital libraries” in developing 
countries. By documenting and publishing such public domain knowledge it becomes 
part of the prior art even under a relative novelty system and can destroy the novelty of 
an invention based on such knowledge.238 The library should take into account 
international patent classification standards and be made easily accessible for patents 
examiners from all over the world, for example by being searchable over the Internet239. 
This defensive protection of traditional knowledge would help to improve the novelty 
examination by the Patent Offices thereby eliminating the main reason for ‘bad’ 
patents.240 Clear cases of plagiarism of traditional knowledge related to genetic 
resources could be avoided certainly. The Turmeric patent, for example, most probably 
would not have been granted when the USPTO had access to written traditional 
knowledge related to Turmeric. 
In cases where the inventor at least used some own creativity patent examiners could at 
least scrutinise the issue of novelty more closely. The Neem patent is an example for 
such a case. If the EPO had access to traditional knowledge from India it could have 
considered the question of novelty more detailed and probably would not have granted 
the patent in the first place. 
 
There are, of course, some concerns related to such a database. The main concern 
expressed is that companies could use these databases as a source of information of so 
far unknown or undisclosed traditional knowledge thus the database itself might “in 
effect roll out the red carpet for ‘biopiracy’.241 However, this concern can just relate to 
the discussion of benefit sharing which is dealt with in the next section. The clear 
benefit of such a digital database of preventing ‘bad’ patents to be granted is not 
impaired even if a company might learn new traditional knowledge. Developing 
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countries could even avoid that disadvantage by restricting access only to Patent 
Offices. Access protected by passwords could be given to the Patent Offices of foreign 
countries. In practice the authorities of the developing country could mandate the 
Foreign Service of a country to take the function of transmitting the password to the 
relevant authorities in the foreign country.  
In the event of rejection of a patent application by a Patent Office due to prior art found 
in the database, this relevant knowledge must be disclosed to the applicant for him to 
prepare a possible opposition to the refusal. This could be seen as a counter argument to 
those databases. However, in such a case the ‘inventor’ had already learned from this 
part of traditional knowledge by other means why the disclosure of the knowledge to 
him would appear irrelevant. The applicant would not learn more than he had already 
done. 
 
Another possibility to weaken that concern would be to disclose traditional knowledge 
solely that is already in the public domain.242 This, of course, would impair the 
effectiveness of the database in preventing ‘bad’ patents since not all traditional 
knowledge would be available to patents examiners in the world.  
 
In any case, prior informed consent of the indigenous communities should be obtained 
before publishing their knowledge in order to protect their rights over their traditional 
knowledge. With the help of this procedure indigenous communities could decide on 
their own whether they want to use the protection provided by such a database or 
whether they rather want to hide their knowledge.  
 
Dolder is critical regarding such databases because they would not generate economical 
benefits.243 This might be true, but such databases are supposed to make available prior 
art to the Patent Offices therefore preventing the grant of ‘bad’ patents. They are not 
developed to produce economic benefits for the holders of traditional knowledge. This 
can be achieved by a sui generis protection system for traditional knowledge as 
mentioned above or with the help of regulations on the access to genetic resources as 
will be mentioned in the next section. 
A sufficient level of protection for traditional knowledge could be secured by 
incorporating traditional knowledge databases in a sui generis protection system for 
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such knowledge. Concerns that “a collection of traditional knowledge in such a database 
… may undermine claims to rights in the traditional knowledge” could be countered 
therewith. 244
 
Thus, one can conclude that a “traditional knowledge digital library” is an important and 
effective element to prevent the granting of ‘bad’ patents in every part of the world. 
This clear benefit is not being countervailed by the concerns mentioned above. 
Moreover, the British Commission on IPR concluded that “greater documentation of 
traditional knowledge … may [also] contribute to the preservation, promotion and 
possible exploitation [by the holders] of traditional knowledge”.245
2. Regulations regarding access to genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge 
The Convention on Biological Diversity asserts the sovereign rights of a country over 
its genetic resources and encourages member countries to enact access legislation with 
regard to such resources.246 The TRIPS agreement on the other hand does not prohibit 
access regulations regarding genetic resources or traditional knowledge outside IPR law 
that are just accompanying Patent law.247 Thus, developing countries are free to adopt 
regulations on access both to genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated 
with such resources. 
 
Access regulations are not only useful to strengthen the power of developing countries 
over their genetic resources, they also can serve as an important element in requiring 
prior informed consent and providing for compelling ‘benefit sharing’ to avoid 
‘biopiracy’” patents worldwide. The logic behind this presumption is that without 
access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated to such resources no 
invention derived from those resources can be developed. The inventor depends on 
access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge in order to produce a pretended 
‘biopiracy’ patent. Access to these resources normally takes place in the country of 
origin where the genetic resources and traditional knowledge are available that in most 
cases are developing countries.248   
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The country of origin should therefore enact access legislation with the following 
requirements. Access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with 
such resources should be subject to prior informed consent of the state or other owners 
of genetic resources or traditional knowledge, as for example indigenous 
communities.249 The legislation should require compensation for the access to genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge or obligatory benefit sharing for the case of 
commercialisation of a product derived from the resources accessed.250 The regulations 
could provide for a minimum amount to be paid or set up a percentage in relation to 
gross sales.251 It must be defined, however, who is the beneficiary of which resources. If 
a company refuses to commit itself to these conditions access to the resources could be 
denied. Enforcement mechanisms like a requirement to present to the national 
authorities a certificate of ‘prior informed consent’ and civil or even criminal sanctions 
such as high fines for illegal access should be provided.252 Therewith some kind of 
deterrence is ensured and the circumvention of the access legislation could be 
minimized.  
 
The commitments mentioned above are still valid and must be fulfilled if the ‘collector’ 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge is not the inventor at the same time but 
transfers the resources to somebody else. The obligation to share the benefits arising 
from the commercialisation of a product derived from the resources accessed continues 
to exist and the ‘collector’ has to ensure this obligation to be met, e.g. by transferring 
this obligation to the company that develops the final product. 
 
There are many possibilities to implement such access regulations. Some countries have 
enacted special access legislation253 others have used general Biodiversity Legislation 
with access regulations incorporated.254 A country could also incorporate access 
regulations on genetic resources and traditional knowledge in a sui generis protection 
system of traditional knowledge.255 The community rights of indigenous communities 
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as mentioned in VI A) 4. could include the rights to demand prior informed consent and 
benefit sharing. These rights could be exercised when access to the protected traditional 
knowledge is sought.  
 
However, countries should pay attention to define ‘access’ as to include also access to 
gene banks, in situ as well as ex situ collections of genetic resources and registries of 
traditional knowledge in the respective country.256 Otherwise the protection against 
non-compensation and unauthorised access would not be comprehensive. Ten Kate 
points out that both access on private as well as on public land should be regulated.257 
With regard to the obligation to ‘benefit sharing’ a rule could provide for the payment 
of compensation to a special development or biodiversity fund in cases where the 
holders of traditional knowledge or genetic resources cannot be clearly identified.258 It 
is conceivably that a country could make an exception to the strict regulations for 
national research activities in order to promote domestic research and facilitate domestic 
innovations.  
 
Thus, access legislation could serve the goals ‘conserving genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, preventing improper use and appropriation, especially through 
IPR system and providing for a compelling benefit sharing mechanism’. 
 
With the help of such a positive protection of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge of indigenous communities developing countries can effectively enforce the 
requirements of prior informed consent and compelling benefit sharing for inventions 
derived from those resources though these inventions are developed abroad. The link is 
not patent law when patent protection is sought for the invention since the incorporation 
of prior informed consent in IPR law is not possible (VI A 1). Developing countries can 
intervene earlier though. They possess the resources in demand why they also can 
regulate the access to them. Without having access nobody is able to exploit those 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge. Without an invention there is no ‘good’ 
patent either. Thus, carefully designed access regulations are an effective pressurising 
medium which developing countries can use to prevent ‘good’ patents from being 
granted in foreign countries.  
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Developing countries should pay attention not to discourage access altogether by 
making the regulations too bureaucratic. Economical participation in the 
commercialisation of products derived from the protected genetic resources is not 
possible without applications for access in the first place. Medaglia notes that without 
access “it is impossible to talk about benefit sharing”.259 Moreover, the more restricted 
access is the more likely it is that companies try to access genetic resources through 
sources outside the territory and therefore outside the regulation scope of the respective 
country. However, the more developing countries enact access legislation the less the 
likelihood of such a circumvention will be. 
3. Education of the indigenous communities 
Another accompanying component of a sound national policy regarding ‘biopiracy’ 
would be to educate indigenous communities to raise awareness of the possible danger 
and of their rights under national legislation to protect their genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge. It also has been emphasised that “strengthening the innovative 
capacity of indigenous and local communities” and the “exchange of experience and 
skills among” such communities would be important to “promote the further 
development and use of traditional knowledge”.260 National authorities could provide 
indigenous communities with guidelines to take into consideration for negotiation of 
benefit sharing agreements.261
Capacity building both in legal and innovative skills can help those communities to 
‘harness their traditional knowledge for development and trade’.262 Well educated 
communities could assert their rights (under a possible access legislation or sui generis 
protection system) against transnational corporations better than it is the case up to now.  
The success of national legislation proposed above to prevent ‘bad’ patents and to 
provide for prior informed consent and benefit sharing could be enhanced therewith. 
4. Promoting commercialisation at home 
In chapter IV B h) it was noted that the problem of loss of export market might even 
appear in the case of properly granted patents. Commercialisation of products and 
services based on traditional knowledge may provide opportunities for developing 
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countries, particularly with traditional medicines.263 Specific legislation as for example 
‘petty patents’ or ‘improvement patents’ could be “developed for patenting ‘new’ 
traditional medicines and herbal remedies”.264 The requirements of inventive step and 
novelty could be defined less exacting as to cover traditional innovations265. China is an 
example that has enacted such legislation and whose use “has been growing rapidly”.266 
It is conceivably to cover other traditional products based on genetic resources as well. 
C. Intermediate Result 
With the help of appropriate legislation as proposed under A. and B. developing 
countries can prevent ‘bad’ patents both in their own territory and also in other 
countries. As seen this can be done by adjusting patent as proposed under A. 3. and 
establishing databases of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources (B 1.). 
Furthermore developing countries can prevent ‘good’ patents because they are able to 
enforce the requirements of prior informed consent and compelling benefit sharing 
outside IPR law in context of access regulations. Everybody, thus even foreign 
corporations, who wants to access genetic resources or traditional knowledge has to 
comply with these conditions. It is irrelevant whether the invention derived from those 
resources will be patented or not. Accompanying measures as education and promotion 
of commercialisation at home can support the prevention of the negative impacts of 
‘biopiracy’. 
VII. Conclusion 
This thesis demonstrated that there are many criticisms related with ‘biopiracy’ but just 
one real problem, namely the possible loss of export markets. The debate is concerned 
with patents that can be divided in two parts: ‘bad’ patents and ‘good’ patents. For both 
it can be stated that they do not jeopardise the way of living of indigenous communities 
in developing countries, as it has been alleged. The effect of the patents granted is 
limited to the territory of the country in which they were granted. There is no worldwide 
enforcement of patents.  
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With respect to ‘bad’ patents one must conclude that the use of the traditional practices 
and genetic resources in the developing country cannot be prohibited by the patentee of 
an ‘invention’ that is in fact the traditional product and that was wrongly patented in 
another country. The same is true for the use of plants that have been patented. The 
indigenous communities can live their lives as they have done over generations. 
Possible economical impacts like raising prices in the Neem case could not be traced 
back to the patent granted. These effects are the based on the commercialisation of 
products and are not dependent on the grant of a patent. The alleged ‘exploitation’ of 
indigenous communities and developing countries by inventions that are allegedly ‘bad’ 
patents could therefore not be confirmed. Rather there was an ‘exploitation’ of both 
traditional knowledge and industrial techniques. Only from a moral point of view there 
could be a difference. However, moral arguments are problematic means to prove 
alleged problems. There is no uniform notion of morality and thus arguments can put 
forward in favour as well as against a criticism. Morality is a rather foreign matter in 
Intellectual Property law. Apart from an exception to patentability based on moral 
grounds there is generally no consideration of ‘morality’ in patent law.  
Moreover, as an author concluded correctly, “simply awarding a patent in an industrial 
country generally does not cause economic harm” to developing countries or indigenous 
communities.267 In none of the examples of ‘bad’ patents had the ‘new’ product 
displaced the traditional one in the developing country.  
 
The only disadvantage directly connected with ‘bad’ patents that could be found is the 
possible loss of export markets. The patentee could prevent the ‘invention’ which in the 
case of a ‘bad’ patent is the known traditional invention to be imported in the country 
where the patent is valid. This economic harm, however, comes through 
commercialisation of the product as just in this case the patentee is interested in 
preventing competing products from being imported.  
 
The main reason of ‘bad’ patents being granted is the non-availability and 
inaccessibility of traditional knowledge to the Patent Offices. Thus, when examining the 
patentability requirements, particularly ‘novelty’ and ‘inventive step’, they do not know 
that the invention is based on traditional knowledge associated with the genetic resource 
used in the invention. However, the ‘relative novelty’ standard, that is possible under 
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the TRIPS regulations and used in the USA, for example, contributes to the problem of 
granting ‘bad’ patents to a large extent.  
 
With the help of appropriate national legislation developing countries can prevent ‘bad’ 
patents from being granted both in their own territory and abroad. Databases of 
traditional knowledge that are made easily accessible for foreign Patent Offices help to 
prove prior art in foreign countries, even in those with a ‘relative novelty’ standard. 
Therewith the main reason of ‘bad’ patents would be averted. The respective developing 
country should adjust its IPR legislation and should use the exceptions to patentability 
provided in the TRIPS agreement to avoid patents on ‘inventions’ based on genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge as much as possible. Accompanied by an ‘absolute’ 
novelty standard, a high standard for ‘inventive step’ and a comprehensive examination 
procedure of their Patent Offices developing countries can effectively avoid the grant of 
‘bad’ patents in their own territory. All examples of ‘bad’ patents that were given in this 
thesis could have been prevented by the proposed legislation.  
 
Without ‘bad’ patents the only problem of ‘bad’ patents, the loss of export markets for 
the traditional product, does not emerge either. One must, however, concede that the 
loss of export markets might also be possible in the case of a properly granted patent on 
an invention derived from genetic resources and traditional knowledge. In such a case 
the traditional product has to compete with the new patented product. Competition, 
however, is the driving power of a market economy and therefore is desirable. 
Moreover, competition is not confined to products derived from traditional knowledge, 
but it is a general phenomenon of an economy. Intellectual Property Rights are 
restricting pure competition in respect of the patented invention for a limited period of 
time though, but in exchange the public is given new and presumably significant 
knowledge. After the protection time everybody can use the knowledge embodied in the 
invention, make use of it and can compete with the formerly protected invention.  
Thus, the ‘problem’ of competition does not relate to the problem ‘bad’ patents and in 
this respect cannot be considered. The criticisms put forward against ‘bad’ patents are 
exaggerated therefore.  
 
With respect to ‘good’ patents one must note that there is no legal obligation for the 
patent applicant to prove prior informed consent of the respective holder of genetic 
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resources and traditional knowledge or to share the benefits accruing from the invention 
unless the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity have been transformed 
in national law. But as seen, a transformation of said requirements in IPR law would 
contravene the TRIPS agreement. Thus, indigenous communities do not have a legal 
right to require these conditions. Moral arguments, however, have been found not to be 
a sound basis for the claimed right of ‘benefit sharing’ and ‘prior informed consent’. 
Firstly, there is not uniform notion of ‘morality’ and its specification. Secondly there are 
moral arguments in favour as well as against the claimed rights. Thus, the criticisms 
related to ‘good’ patents are not justified either. 
 
Moreover, developing countries are able to require patent applicants worldwide to share 
benefits arising out of the invention and to prove prior informed consent even though 
the applicant does not apply for a patent in the respective developing country. The link 
for the said requirements is not IPR law but the access to the genetic resources and / or 
traditional knowledge. For an invention to be invented based on genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge of a developing country or respectively an indigenous community 
the inventor has to access those resources in the first place. As every country has the 
sovereign right to regulate access to its resources and the TRIPS agreement is not 
concerned with regulations outside IPR law developing countries can incorporate the 
desired requirements in special access legislation or in sui generis protection systems of 
traditional knowledge.  
Though these requirements are not patentability requirements and a patent theoretically 
could be granted in a foreign country without the developing country’s requirements of 
access have been fulfilled they effectively can be enforced by the developing country. It 
just has to enforce the access to its resources strictly by providing enforcement 
mechanisms with civil and criminal sanctions. Interesting alternatives for such access 
legislation have been proposed. 
 
When discussing the problem ‘good’ patents one also has to keep in mind that 
developing countries can also profit from intellectual property rights. In conjunction 
with ‘bad’ patents it has been mentioned that even in the case of a properly granted 
patent on an invention derived from traditional knowledge the ‘problem’ of competition 
will emerge. Competition, however, also entails economic chances for developing 
countries. They own the bulk of genetic resources and their indigenous communities 
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own the very valuable asset of ‘traditional knowledge’. By enhancing innovations by 
educating indigenous communities and promoting commercialisation of products 
derived from this knowledge and providing protection through ‘petty patents’ or ‘utility 
models’ they are certainly able to produce competitive products. The example of China 
was mentioned where ‘petty patents’ can be granted on new products of traditional 
medicine that are used widely. ‘Modern’ drugs that base upon traditional medicine 
almost certainly do not have more success in fighting an ailment since the essentially 
just contain the active ingredient extracted from the traditional medicine put in a pill. 
That is why promoting traditional products often will bring success both in the home 
country as well as abroad. This is confirmed by the UNCTAD Secretariat that sees 
economic opportunities for developing countries with the commercialisation of products 
based on traditional knowledge, particularly in the field of herbal medicines.268 It cites 
the example of India which supported by appropriate legislation exports herbal products 
of about US $ 8 million annually with fast growing figures.269 Additionally Indian 
Ayurveda products are entering the global market as well. In countries with weaker 
technological basis cooperation between foreign companies and indigenous 
communities could be a reasonable solution, especially when access and benefit sharing 
regulations are in place. 
 
In sum one must come to the conclusion that the fear of ‘biopiracy’ patents and the 
criticisms related to them are exaggerated and with respect to the impacts not justified. 
The criticisms apart from one could not be validated. Moreover, developing countries 
themselves are able to prevent internationally ‘bad’ as well as ‘good’ patents from being 
granted. Thus they themselves are able to avoid the alleged negative impacts by 
enacting appropriate national legislation. Moreover, they are also able to profit from 
their genetic resources and traditional knowledge by enacting appropriate IPR and 
accompanying legislation. 
 
The debate on the phenomenon ‘biopiracy’ is basically not an original problem of patent 
law. It appears to be more a worry about opportunities to benefit from own resources 
and about a just distribution of the benefits arising from its use and commercialisation 
by foreign companies. The ‘biopiracy’ discussion is therefore closely linked with the 
“old” conflict between developing and more developed countries which exists in the 
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context of worldwide trade and the issue of equal opportunities. The debate on this topic 
seems to be a possibility for developing countries to point out their points of view and 
their positions. Although developing countries might have a disadvantage in regard to 
technological and financial resources they are, however, able to benefit from their own 
resources with the help of appropriate legislation as demonstrated. The fear of the 
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